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INTRODUCTION

Modem diplomacy has, over the years, come to signify
the development of external relations between the world's
major powers.

When one looks back upon the diplomatic

history of the twentieth century, he is struck by such key
phrases as "the Big Pour" or "the Big Five."

However,

the art of diplomacy is not confined to the larger powers
alone.

The smaller states, particularly In wartime, have

often assumed a role completely out of proportion to their
relative size.

Witness, in this regard, the role played

by such normally insignificant powers as Serbia in 1914,
Poland in 1939, Korea in 1950, or Viet Nam in 196?„
A small state need not, however, become a battle
ground to assume an important role in the diplomacy of
nations.

If it contains within its borders economic, pol

itical or military assets, a smaller power may well find
Itself in the limelight of diplomatic affairs.

Such was

the case with Ireland in the Second World War when, because
of its strategical importance, it found itself the unwilling
recipient of Nazi Germany's attentions.
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Germany's Interest in Ireland stemmed, not from any
Intrinsic value of that country, but rather, from Ire
land's geographical proximity to Britain.

Therefore,

German military and political authorities never viewed
neutral Eire as an end unto itself but simply as a means
of striking at Great Britain.

In short, Ireland became

an unlocked door through which the ïhlrd Belch might
enter Britain.
The German exploitation of Eire's neutrality took
two broad or basic forms, political and military.

Neither

method, however, can be truly separated, for each served
to complement the other.

Politically, through the German

Legation in Dublin, and the various agencies of the pro
paganda and Intelligence departments, Nazi Germany sought
to strengthen the will of the Irish government to remain
indiscriminately neutral.

In doing so, Nazi diplomacy

directly aided the German military staffs which sought to
use Eire to advantage in the Battle of the Atlantic and as
a possible base of attack against Britain.
There are four examples which can be studied to ascer
tain the extent to which the diplomatic and military estab
lishments of Germany used Eire, and more specifically* Irish
neutrality0 to accomplish their objectives.

The first of

these deals with the efforts made by German diplomacy to
maintain Eire's neutralityto Influence the views of Eire
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toward pro-British Northern Ireland, and finally, but
by no means least importantly, to strengthen the minority
pro-German sentiment which existed In Eire during the
Second World War.
The second case deals with the German diplomatic
efforts to maintain the neutrality of Irish sea ports,
which assumed a position of high Importance during the
Battle of the Atlantic.

Viewed also in this regard Is the

effect which the neutrality of those ports had upon the
German naval campaign àgainst British shipping.
Third, one must study the operations of the German
Intelligence service in Eire.

The intelligence depart

ment (or Abwehr) sought throughout the war to build an
Intelligence network in Ireland, to use Eire as a base
for esiponage activities in Northern Ireland and Britain,
and to bring direction to the efforts of the violently
anti-British, ,ultra-nationalist Irish Republican Army.
In so doing, the Abwehr delved into both the political
and military spheres of influence in Ireland.
The final case deals with the proposed German invasion
of Ireland.

Although primarily a military problem, the

invasion plan nonetheless had political ramifications as
well.
Before turning to a detailed analysis of the four
cases in point, it is necessary to submit two factors
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which had a Waring on German relations with Eire.
first is the simple issue of precedent.

The

None of the

four studies was initiated by Nazi Germany,

Each had

been attempted either by a Germany of an earlier era,
or by an entirely different country.

Host importantly„

the Third Reich was forced to take into account the
delicate question of Irish sensibilities and Irish opinion.

CHAPTER I
GEEMANY AND THE MAINTENANCE OF IRISH NEUTRALITY
German diplomats who arrived In Dublin during the
period immediately preceding World War II discovered a
new country^ Eire, with a political position founded upon
neutrality.

After several centuries of British rule, Ire

land, or at least the southern twenty-sli counties, had
become a Free State In 1921o

By 1937, many of the final

ties between Ireland and Britain had been removed:

the

king was no longer recognized as ruler In Southern Ireland;
all colonial offices had been abolished; a measure of economic independence had been attained, and finally, to make
clear that the country was indeed Independent, the Gaelic
term Eire had replaced its English equivalent, Ireland.^
While German diplomats could, therefore, quite readily
understand the nature of the new state, they no doubt had
much more difficulty in discerning the nature of Irish neu^
trallty.

Generally, one can arrive at two reasons why the

Irish government, in the pre-war period, came to the de
cision to remain neutral in the event of a world conflict.

^ All of the above are found in the 1937 Irish Constit
ution,

5
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The first stems from simple political reality in a world
dominated by a few major powers„
Eire, Eamon de

Valera,

The Prime Minister of

^ had also served, during the 1930's,

as President of the League of Nations.

At League president^

de Valera had been most strongly affected by the Abyssinian
crisis and the inability of the League to restrain a large
state.

Speaking on July 2, 1936, de Valera exemplified the

frustration felt by the head of a small nation in a world
rapidly evolving into two great military camps s
is there any small nation represented here which
does not feel the truth of the warning that what
l8 Ethiopia's fate to-day may well be Its own fate
to-morrow, should greed or the ambition of some
powerful neighbors prompt its destruction. . . .
peace is dependent upon the will of the great
States. All the small States can do. If the
statesmen of the greater States fail in their duty,
l8 resolutely to determine that they will resist
with whatever strength they possess every attempt
to force them into a war against their will.3
Obviously, as a smaller nation, Eire would remain neutral
In a world conflict.

=

In addition to political reality, there was also something akin to a moral issue Involved in Dublin"s decision to
maintain neutrality.

During the many years of struggle to

regain their independence, the Irish had created a large
degree of pride in their nation and its accomplishments.

Eamon de Valera, 1882~present<, De Valera served as
head of state of the Free State from 1932-1938, Prom 19381948 and 1951-195^ he was Prime Minister of Eire. He is now
President of the Republic of Ireland.
3 Eamon de Valera, Peace and War; Speeches by Mr. de
Valera on International Affairs, (Dublin, 1944), 54— 59.

7
That pride could not, in 1939o allow them to join their
old overlord Britain in a war aginst Nazi Germany,

Al

though Germany had earlier provided aid to the Irish in
their seach for independence,^ and theoretically could
also aid Eire to reclaim the northern six counties still
under British control, Dublin could not Join the side of
the Axis powers either.

To join either side in the conflict

would have meant an abandonment of Eire's freedom of inde
pendent actions.

As a result, as the war progressed, neut

rality became increasingly associated with independence,
German diplomats thus were faced with two tasks in
the coming war—to urge the Irish to maintain their neutrallty, and to exploit that neutrality to the benefit of
their fatherland.

Wartime relations between Germany and Eire were guided,
in all fields of Interest, by three major considerations,
the most important of which was the conduct of Anglo-Irish
affairs,

Ireland, the "backdoor to England," proved to be

a constant problem to the policy makers at Whitehall.

As

a result, Anglo-Irish affairs served as an excellent baro
meter of German-Irish affairs? for when relations between
Britain and Eire were at their worst, as was the case bet
ween 1939 and 1944, German-Irish relations were generally
4 For details of German aid to the Irish in their search
for independence, see Chapter III.
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at their best.
The opinion of Irish-Americans was yet another
factor which served to influence the German attitude
toward Eire.

In conducting their relations with Eire,

both Germany and Great Britain considered the reaction
among the Irish living in the United States.

While this

was, of course, more important before the entry of the
United States into the war, it nevertheless continued to be
an area of consideration throughout the conflict.
Of a more direct effect upon the relations between the
two countries was the existence of pro-British Northern Ireland.

Prime Minister de Valera had, when he declared that

Eire would remain neutral in the event of war, based his
decision in part on the fact that Britain was helping to
maintain the existence of an independent Ulster»

Cooper-

atlon between Britain and Eire, he stated, would be "very,
very slight" as long as partition of the island remained.
Furthermore» if, when war started, British troops remained
stationed in Northern Ireland, Irish sentiment undoubtedly
would become more hostile toward Great Britain.^

While

Britain chose to support its sometimes bellicose ally in
Northern Ireland, Germany could only gain by giving support

5 Survey of International Affairs, 19^9-1946, Vol. Ill,
"The War and the Neutrals,"^"{London, 1956) <, 235." Hereafter
cited as Survey.
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to Dublin»

As a result, the German foreign office and

propaganda ministry became increasingly vocal in support
of Irish demands seeking an end to partition.

On April 26, 1939, relations between Great Britain and
Eire reached a new low.

Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain^

announced on that day the establishment of the Military
Training Bill by which military conscription was to be
initiated in Great Britain and Northern Ireland,

De Valera,

who firmly believed that the northern six counties were an
integral part of the Irish Republic, viewed the bill as an
act of aggression against Eire.

On May 2, he denounced the

bill before the Dail Eireann (parliament) protesting "in
the strongest terms the imposition of conscription in that
part of our country."?

The Irish Prime Minister was joined

in his opposition to the bill by all members of the Dail,
as well as the nationalists and Catholics in Northern Ire
land, and the Irish in the United States,®
On May 4, Chamberlain, perhaps fearing that hostil
ities would once more begin between Irish nationalists

^ Neville Chamberlain, 1869-1940. From October, 1931
to May, 1937, Chamberlain served as the Chancellor of the
Exchequer, and from May, 1937 until 19^0 he was prime min
ister.
? Survey, VII, 236.
8 Round Table, No. 115, "Ireland's Vital Problems,"
June, 1939, 590-591.
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and loyalists 5 announced that Ireland would not be Included
In the Military Training Bill.

While feelings were some

what placated in Eire, loyalists north of the border viewed
the decision as being yet another surrender to Eamon de
Valera.^
The German foreign ministry, while it was kept in
formed on the progress of events, remained silent during
the incident.

However, Foreign Minister Joachim von

Ribbentrop^® later instructed the German Minister in Eire,
Eduard Eempel,^^ to inform the Irish Prime Minister (with
out specifically mentioning possible German aid to end
partition) that "wide sympathy was felt in Germany for
Ireland and the national aspirations of the Irish people.
Undoubtedly the Reich government thought the time Inappro
priate for alienating the British government by more

^ The Times (London), April 29, 1939 afid May
1939.
10 Joachim von Ribbentrop^ 1883-19^6. In 1931, Ribben
trop became Hitler's personal advisor on foreign affairs,
and from 1936-1938 he served as ambassador to England.
Ribbentrop held the position of Foreign Minister of Germany
from 1938-1943, and was hanged as a war criminal at Nurem
berg in October, 1946.
Eduard Eempel, German Minister to Eire, 1937-19^5U.S. Department of State, Documents on German Foreign
Policy. 1918-1945. Series D, VII, Doc. No. 428, 422. Hereafter cited as D.G.F.P.
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strongly supporting Irish demands.
For the remainder of the summer» diplomatic activity
between Germany and Eire remained somewhat subdued.
However, in the week immediately preceding the outbreak
of war activity between Berlin and Dublin greatly In
creased.

On August 24, Hempel Informed Ribbentrop that

Joseph P. Walshe 9.^3 the Secretary General of the Irish
Foreign Ministry, had contacted him on the previous day.
At that time Walshe once more assured the German minister
that Eire would definitely remain neutral If war were
declared between the major powers.

Only a definite attack,

Walshe stated, would provoke Eire to change Its non1 it
belligerent position.
Three days later, Ribbentrop Instructed Hempel that.
In view of the deterioration of the political situation.
It was necessary to make a formal declaration of policy
toward Ireland.

The declaration, as presented to de

Valera, contained the usual assurances of good will and,
In addition, a rather vague threat:

Joseph Patrick Walshe, wartime Secretary General
of tt# Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Eire. De Valera, In
addition to being Prime Minister, also served as Foreign
Minister.
14 D.G.F.P., VII, Doc. No. 303, 311.
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In accordance with the friendly relations
between ourselves and Ireland we are determined
to refrain from any hostile action against Irish
territory and to respect her integrity, pro
vided that Ireland « for her part, maintains un
impeachable neutrality towards us in any conflict.
Only if this condition should no longer be ob
tained as a result of a decision of the Irish
Government themselves, or by pressure exerted
on Ireland from other quarters, should we be
compelled as a matter of course . . . to safe
guard our interests in the sphere of warfare in
such a way as the situation then arising might
demand of us.
Hempel also informed de Valera that all Irish citizens
then living in Germany would be allowed to remain there,
even if war should come, and that Germany would make
every effort to avoid disrupting Irish trade in the pro
gress of the submarine war,
De Valera, upon receiving the German declaration,
reiterated that the Irish government Intended to remain
unimpeachably neutral.

However, the neutrality of Eire,

and the maintenance of good relations between the two
countries, would be dependent upon a number of conditions.
Ireland's close proximity to Britain, and its dependence
upon trade with that country « forced the Irish government
to "show certain consideration for Britain, which in
similar circumstances they would also show Germany.
De Valera further requested that Germany refrain from

D.G.F.P.. VII, Doc. No. ^4.28, ^4.22.
Ibid.
17 Ibid. Doc. No. 484, 4?!.
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violating Irish territorial waters, exploiting the antiBritish Irish Republican Army, and taking hostile action
against the Irish of pro-British sentiment in Ulster.
In the years of war which followed, Eire remained well
within the legal limits of its neutrality.

However,

Germany continually saw fit to overlook the conditions
which had been established before the war.
During the first month of the war, as the Wehrmacht
overran Poland and the Allies manned defensive positions
in France, Eire remained untouched by continental events.
Except in the sphere of naval matters, Ireland was of
little or no interest to the major powers who busily
19
watched the progress of the war in the east» - The majority
of the Irish themselves strongly supported de Valera in
his determination to keep the country neutral, with the
result that a strengthened national self-consciousness
quickly arose.

;

Although Ireland was thus fulfilling its selfappointed commitment to neutrality, the German foreign
ministry nonetheless recognized that any combination of

18 D.G.F.P.. VII. Doc. No. 484, 4?!.
^9 One curious exception to the lack of Interest in
Ireland was reported by the London Times on September 3:
"The British in Peking . . . this morning woke to kind banners
hung across the streets, declaring in English? 'Let Ireland
be represented in China' and 'Ireland is no longer the slave
of Britain.' A few early risers saw Chinese police of the
Japanese-sponsored Chinese.Government;hanging up the
banners „ . „ its object is puzzling."
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the many external and Internal Influences affecting Eire
could bring about a change In policy.

The question of

German-Irish relations was therefore once again brought
up in October.
On October 8, Eempel reported that Irlsh^opinlon,
"especially In view of the sympathy for Catholic Poland
which has had a fate similar to Ireland's," was at that
20
time largely anti-German.
However, the German radio had
nevertheless succeeded in prompting pro-German sympathies
in the rural areas of the Island.

As a result, Hempel

suggested that Germany continue to support "consolidation
of Irish neutrality and independence on a broad national
basis, which Is also Important in its effect on the Domin
ions, India, and America, as symptom of the loosening of
the ties

of Empire. *^1

During the remainder of 1939, German-Irish relations
continued to be relatively good.

Indeed, relations were

somewhat Improved In November, when the United States
announced that Eire would thenceforth be considered
within the combat zone in which American shipping could
not operate.

The Irish government, perhaps believing

the announcement to be the result of indirect British
pressure to abandon neutrality, sent an immediate complaint

20 D.G.F.P.. VIII, Doc. No. 216, 241.
21 Ibid.

15
to the American Secretary of State, Cordell Hull.

The

entire episode resulted in the increased determination
of Eire to remain neutral and, hence, outside the Allied
block.
In the period preceding the German invasion of the
West, Ireland completed the motions of assuming a warlike
footing.

The Irish army» which had numbered 15,000 at

the beginning of the war, was eventually increased to
150,000 with the addition of reservists and volunteers,
A rigid censorship was initiated, as was a rather half
hearted attempt to bring the blackout to Eire's major
Oh
cities.
The principal question in Ireland nonetheless
remained, as it had before, the continuance of partition.
Although Germany and Great Britain sought to Influence the
final settlement of the question, the main conflict re
mained an Irish one, between Dublin and Belfast.

De Valera,

seeking to end partition and remain neutral in the same
instant, was opposed by Lord Cralgavon,^^ the Anglophile
Prime Minister of Northern Ireland.

Craigavon viewed

22 Cordell Hull, 1871-1939= Hull served as senator from
Tennessee from 1931-1933, and as secretary of state, 1933-1944.
23 The Times (London), November 15» 1939.
Ibid, November 7, 1939.
25 Lord Craigavon, James Craig, 1871-1940. Leader of the
Ulster Unionists who sought union with Britain, and the first
Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, 1921-1940.

16
de Valera's effort as yet another attempt at "black
mailing the British Government to end partition, and
this at the very moment when the enemy is at our gates.
Ireland became Increasingly Important after Germany's
successful invasion of the Low Countries and France<.
Popular opinion in Britain, which had previously regarded
Irish neutrality as a necessary (if somewhat bothersome)
evil, became more Intensely outspoken In its demands
that Eire discard its neutral position.

Solutions to the

problam of closing "England's back door" ranged the entire
gamut of credibility„

Some elements in Britain, quite

few in number, suggested that the United Kingdom might
sacrifice Northern Ireland to Eire in an effort to buy
Irish participation In the war.

At the ppposlte end of

the pole came the near-hysterloal plan to send the Canadian Air Force Into Eire and the Polish and Gzeck Legions
together with Charles de Gaulle's French Legion, to the
border between Northern and Southern Ireland^ '

By far

the most serious possibility, insofar as Germany and
Eire were concerned, was the threat of a British invasion
of Ireland,
The situation reached crisis proportions when
Winston Churchill, an opponent of previous concessions
26 The Times (London), July 1, 1940.
27 Time, XXXVI, July 15, 1940, 2].
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to Ireland, Issued a strong statement denouncing the
Irish stand on neutrality and hinted at possible action
2A
to alleviate the situation.
De Valera Immediately
announced that Eire was prepared to defend itself against
any aggressor, including Great Britain.
The German foreign ministry seized the situation as
an excellent opportunity to further strengthen GermanIrish relations, and therefore indirectly strike at
Great Britain.

Accordingly « Ernst von

Weizsaeker,^^

the

German State Secretary of the Foreign Ministry, instructed
Minister Hempel on November 13 to inform de Valera that
Germany expected Eire to resist any British interference
in Irish neutrality.

By doing so, Eire would join in a

common front with Germany and, hence, would "realise her
national goals" when Britain was crushed.
While Ribbentrop's foreign ministry thus urged on
Dublin through diplomatic channels, German military author
ities initiated investigation into the possibility of
furnishing military assistance to Ireland in the event
of a British attack.

On November 14, General Walter

28 Time. XXXVI, November 18, 1940, 26-2?.
^9 Ernst Von Weizaeker, 1882-1951 » State Secretary
of the German Foreign Ministry,'1938-1943.
30 D.G.F.P.. XI. Doo. No. 333, 570.
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Warllmont,^^ Deputy Chief of the Operations Staff of the
German High Command, Oberkommando der Wehrmaoht (OKW),
informed Special Ambassador Karl Rltter^^ that, because
Britain controlled the sea and air between the continent
and Ireland, little could actually be done to prevent
British military moves.

However, Warllmont believed that

German submarines could be deployed around the Irish ports,
which Great Britain would most certain seize, and that
Luftwaffe attacks could be extended to areas in Ireland
occupied by the British.

Until badly needed supplies were

received, it would be Impossible to provide further aid,
such as the landing of airborne troops.

The war diary of

the Wehrmaoht Operations Staff nonetheless noted that,
"Ambassador Hitter believes that In this case the Fuehrer
will demand the utmost of the Wehrmaoht."33 ,
Ten days following the conference between Eltter and
Warllmont, Ribbentrop forwarded to Hempel a top-secret,
coded message instructing the German minister to contact
de Valera, personally if possible, to discover the extent
to which German aid might be welcomed,

Hempel had earlier

Informed the foreign ministry that many sources in Eire,
including the Minister of Justice, Arthur Boland, believed
31 Walter Warllmont, Deputy Chief of the Operations Staff
I939-I944. Transferred to OKH Command Pool In 1944.
32 Karl Hitter, Ambassador on Special Assignment»
33 D.G.F.P.. XI, Doo. No. 333. 570.
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that an Irish request for German aid was actually under
consideration.

Rlbbentrop stated that if such were the

case, and if a British attack oame« the Irish government
"could very well imagine that the Rieoh Government would be
in a position to give Ireland vigorous support and would be
inclined to do so."^^

If Dublin proved agreeable, Hempel was

to find by which ship, and into which ports, German military
supplies might be sent.
On November 28, General Alfred Jodl,^^ Chief of Oper
ations of the OKM, reported to Hitter that both Hitler and
Rlbbentrop believed that, if Eire defended itself to the ut
most, the expected British invasion would cause "tremendous
repercussions" in many of the world's capitals.

In the event

of suoh an invasion taking place, the OKW was considering the
shipment of captured British weapons to Eire.

Such weapons,

Jodl stated, could be easily transferred to Eire aboard
Irish ships from the German ports In France.
The following day Rlbbentrop Instructed Hempel to
approach de Yalera on the subject of arms shipments.
"The German Government," Hempel was to tell the Irish

34 D.G.p.p.. XI, Doc. No. 407, 718.
35 Alfred Jodl, 1890-1946. Hitler's chief advisor on
strategy and operations in World War II, Chief of Army
Operations Staff, 1939-1945. Hanged at Nuremberg, 1946.
3^ D.G.P.P. ,, XI, Doc. No. 416, 727. Irish ships were to
travel in a circular course, entering Allied shipping routes
west of Ireland, appearing to be en route from the U.S.
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Prime Minister, "was naturally Interested in strength
ening Ireland's power to resist" a British attack,3?
.Germany had5 as a result of the French capitulation^
acquired a large number of arms abandoned by the British.
These weapons could now be transferred, free of cost, to
the Irish in such a way that their neutrality would not
be threatened.^®
Hempel informed the foreign ministry on December 7«
that, while he had not talked with de Valera as yet, he
had discovered that there were many influential people in
Eire who feared that Germany might fall to support the
Irish if Britain attacked,

Hempel suggested that Berlin

reassure Eire of its Intention to assist in the event of
hostilities between Great Britain and

Ireland,

The German minister, seizing upon the confusion of the
moments advised the foreign ministry that the question
of Northern Ireland might then be openly broached by
Germany,

Neither de Valera, who sought the peaceful

return of the northern six counties, nor any member of
his government, had previously sought out the possibilities
of active German aid in recovering Ulster.

However,

Hempel advised that, even if de Valera continued his
37 D.G.F.P.. XI, Doc, No. 455, 793.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid. XI, Doc, No. 466, 804.
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non-violènt policy toward partition, visible German
participation In the restoration of Irish unity would
be favorably accepted when the time came.

Above all,

the Luftwaffe must continue to refrain from bombing
cities in Northern Ireland, due to the good effect such
a policy had in Eire.

In Southern Ireland it was felt

that the lack of attacks upon Ulster was visible proof
that Germany regarded the North as an Integral part of
neutral Eire.^^
A short time after Hempel Issued his report, he
met with Secretary General Walshe, who advised him of
the then current Anglo-Irish situation.

Walshe believed

that circumstances had eased the threat of a British
invasion, although "there was always the danger of a
sudden, reckless move" by Churchill.British anta
gonism toward Eire had, according to Walshe, been some
what tempered by the apparent determination of the Irish
to resist attack.

In addition, any hope which the British

might hold of reuniting the two countries would also be
lost if Britain took aggressive action against its
neighbor to the west.

Both Hempel and Walshe agreed

that the primary influence on British policy during the
continuing crisis was the opinion of the Irish living
4^ D.G.P.P.. XI, Doc. No. 466, 804.
41 Ibid, Doc. No. 485, 832.
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in the United States.

The reactions of the Irish-

American community had been outspoken and effective.
The British government, not wishing to endanger its
relations with the United States, quite naturally re
spected the influence such activities could have upon
the American government.

The situation, as a result„
2
was being viewed with greater calm.
Although the threat of invasion had-therefore sub
sided to a degree, it nonetheless remained an important
question in Berlin and Dublin.

On December 19, Walshe

oontaoted the German minister to discuss the question of
the arms shipments proposed by Jodl and Ribbentrop.

De

Valera and the Irish Minister of Defense, Francis Aiken,^3
had previously told Walshe thàt, because of the danger of
detection, the arms could not be landed safely in Eire.

If

the British discovered the attempt, the entire episode would
be exposed as a Nazi plot and, hence, an excellent excuse
would be furnished for the invasion of Eire»

The Irish

government therefore abandoned the idea of importing arms from
Axis sources until the British actually invaded.

4^ D.G.F.P.. XI. Doo. No. 485, 832.
^3 Francis Aiken, born 1898. Minister of Defense, 19331939, Minister for Co-ordination of Defense, 1939-1945, Min
ister for External Affairs, 1951-1954, and 1957-pre8ent.
Deputy Prime Minister, 1965-present.
44 D.G.F.P., XI, Doc. No. 523, 882. The German
government was not the only Axis power of offer arms to
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As 1940 drew to a close, de Yalera made what had
become his annual Christmas speech to the United States»
He appealed to Ireland's friends In America for aid in
the form of weapons and foodstuffs, for which the Irish
government would willingly pay.

"At no time," the Prime

Minister stated, "has there been friction of any kind
between us and the belligerent Governments."^^
Although de Valera greatly oversimplified the
situation, the extremely tense condition of affairs
between Great Britain and Eire did continue to improve
in the months following his speech.

The threat to the

British contained within the proposed German invasion of
Great Britain began to decline In 1941 as Hitler turned
his attention to Russia.

The war at sea continued however

to prove victorious for German submarines, and the recovery
of the Irish bases as a consequence remained one of
Churchill's primary remedies for what could prove to be
a disastrous situation.
Regardless of the still present danger from Britain,
de Valera was able in March, 1944 to inform Hempel that

the Irish. Minister Hempel reported In the above document
that the "Italian Caproni concern, which is represented
by Edgar Brand, Paris, had offered to the Irish Minister
in Rome—incidentally with the' knowledge of the Italian
Government—to deliver the arms which the Irish Government
previously had ordered from Brand,"
^5 The Times (London), December 2?, 1940.
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there were no signs at that time of an invasion by
the British being eminent.

The threat nonetheless con

tinued in the background, and if the situation should
change, for example by the entrance of the United States
into the war, the British might still attack,
When the subject of German arms shipments was once
again raised by Berlin, de Valera remained skeptical
that such German aid could reach Ireland unnoticed.
However, the Prime Minister informed Hempel that he
remained confident that "the German General Staff, even
without Irish participation, would presumably with German
thoroughness take the measures that seemed appropriate"
if a crisis should develop.

Following the talks, Hempel

reported to BerllnJ.that, although chances seemed slight,
the possibility still existed that de Valera might yet
seek German assistance.47
Two days following the conversation between de Valera
and Hempel, Warlimont reported that the 0K¥ was still
prepared to offer only limited aid to Eire, and that in
the form of submarine and air support.

The OKW had «

however, finished gathering large quantities of arms
and ammunition which were then ready for shipment to Eire
46 D.G.F.P..
47 Ibid.

XII, Dbo. No. l^O, 270.
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if the Irish Prime Minister consented„
Relations between Germany and Eire, which had been
strengthened by the threat from Britain, rapidly deteri
orated. as the summer of 1941 approached.

At that time

the Luftwaffe abandoned its policy of avoiding targets
in Northern Ireland as a concession to the views of the
South.

Although the German air force had a legitimate

reason for conducting air operations over Ulster, in that
the British had been continuously building and strength
ening their military installations in the area, the raids
nevertheless had an instantly poor effect upon relations
between Berlin and Dublin.

As a result of the bombing

missions. Irishmen on both sides of the border drew to
gether in an equal determination to resist any aggressor.
The situation became increasingly tense on May 31,
when for the third time the Luftwaffe "accidentally"
bombed Dublin, causing I50 casualties and leaving ^00
Dubllners homeless.

Five days prior to the attack de

Valera had, before the Dail Elreann, expressed his
government's attitude of "friendly neutrality" toward
Great Britain.

The raid, therefore, might well have

48 D.G.F.P., XII, Doo. No. 164, 290. The arms which
had been collected included 46 field guns, 550 machine guns,
10,000 rifles, 1,000 antitank guns, and necessary ammunition.
^9 Round Table, No. 124, "Divided Ireland," September,
1941, 741-742.
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been a reminder of what would increasingly occur If Eire
sought closer relations with the Allies,

Whatever the

cause of the attack, its result was a momentary warming
of relations between Eire and Great Britain.
The British initiative, which at that moment could
have swayed Irish opinion to the Allied cause, was lost
due to the inept time of Winston Churchill.

At the end

of May, Churchill again felt the need to raise the question
of conscripting Northern Irish into the British army.

How

ever» on this occasion Irish opinion became quite inflamed
on both sides of the border.

A number of Ul8termen,'who

no doubt felt that Northern Ireland was already doing more
than its share for the Allied cause, objected strongly to
the proposed measure.

As a result. In the first weeks of

June, Churohill again decided to drop the matter, "although,"
as he stated, "there can be no dispute about our rights or
the merit of the case, it would be more trouble than it is
worth to enforce such a policy.

•5^ Bound Table, No. 124, "Divided Ireland," September
1941, 744-749. and Time. XXXVI, June 9, 1941, 30. After
the war ended the attack upon Dublin was Indeed proved to
have been an error. The R.A.F. admitted, in March, 1946,
that it had jammed Luftwaffe radio instruments, causing them
to inadvertantly bomb Dublin rather than Belfast, their
original target. Time, XLVII, March 4, 1946, 29.
51 Time, XXXVII, June 9, 1941. The simple case of
numbers might also have Influenced Churchill, Ulster, with a
population of 1.3 million, could only furnish approximately
50,000 men to the British armed forces, hardly a figure worth
causing untold difficulties over.
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The diplomatic situation remained fluid until December,
when the United States entered the war.

As long as the

United States had remained neutral, Britain was forced to
take opinion In that country Into consideration when plan
ning moves in regard to Eire.

With the voice of the Irish-

American community silenced in the patriotic rush to war, a
valuable source of opinion power was lost to Germany and Eire.
Immediately following its declaration of war, the
United States took the lead in attempts to convince Eire
to abandon Its neutrality.

On December 22, Roosevelt set

the tone for the future when he dispatched a note to Dublin
expressing his confidence that the Irish government and
people "would know how to meet their responsibilities in
the present situation.
On January 26, 1942, a much more graphic example of
the United States policy occurred.

As previously arranged

by Churchill and Roosevelt at the Acadia conference, the
first contingent of American troops landed In Northern
Ireland.
worded„

The. reaction from Dublin was Immediate and strongly
De Valera vehemently objected to the debarkation

of troops on what he considered territory belonging to the
Irish Republic and protested that he had not been consulted
or forwarned of the decision.

Fear that the American

U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the
United States, Diplomatic Papers, T9QTT1II, 291-292. Hereafter cited as P.R.U.8.
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forces might be employed to forcibly retake the Irish ports
and, hence, bring about an end to Irish neutrality, led to
a strengthening of the internal security of the island.
Roosevelt quickly moved to placate the feelings of
the irate Irish.

Publioally, he referred to de Valera

as an old friend, and one who would always have a standing
Invitation to the White House.

Privately, Roosevelt con

fided in his Secretary of State Cordell Hull, that "if
only he (de Valera) would come out of the clouds, we would
ch.
all have a higher regard for him."^
Opinion in Germany viewed the incident as yet
another Allied diplomatic blunder, and one which could
quite possibly improve the always fluid German-Irish
situation.

Dr. Joseph Goebbels,

the Reichsminister

for Propaganda, noted that the Incident had caused a
"great sensation" in Germany.

De Valera"s reaction

to the landing of American troops, which Dr. Goebbels
viewed as an English-sponsored plot to intimidate the
Irish, was stronger than had been anticipated In Lon
don and Washington.

Whatever the motivation for the

Mary C. Bromage, De Valera and the March of a Nation,
(New York, 1956)« 268. Hereafter cited as Bromage,
5^ Ibid.

•55 Dr. Joseph Goebbels, 1897-1945. In November, 1928
Goebbels was placed in charge of Nazi propaganda, and held
the same position until the end of the war.
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incident, Goebbels observed that the United States action
"offends the Irish more than it enlightens them.
The strain between Ireland and the Allies was not
allowed to abate.

On February 26, further contingents

of United States troops landed in Northern Ireland,
causing de Valera to once again send a strongly worded
note to Washington.

The United States was. In his opinion,

furthering the partition of Ireland by such moves, which
was "as indefensible as aggression against all nations
which is the avowed purpose of Britain and the United States
in this war to bring to an end."^^
In answering the Irish note. President Roosevelt was
not as conciliatory as he had been the previous month.
The American message contained within it the same method
of persuasion employed by the United States later In the
war to pressure neutral states into joining thé Allied
fold:
At some future date when Axis aggression
has been crushed by the military might of
free peoples, the nations of the earth must
gather about a peace table to plan the future
world on foundations of liberty and justice
everywhere, I think It only right that I make
plain at this time that when that time comes

Dr. Joseph Goebbels, The Goebbels Diaries, 19421943, Louis P. Lochner, ed. & trans., (Garden City, N.Y.,
TpFo), January 29, 1942. Hereafter cited as Goebbels.
Survey, VII, 246.
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the Irish Government should be associated with
its traditional friends, and, among them, the
United States of America.5"
If the Allies had hoped that the Irish would become
more responsive toward their cause as a result of the
American action, they-were proven to be mistaken.

De

Valera, pointing out that the American action was a
threat to national security and to Ireland's Independence «
used the incident as a means of further strengthening
the government's position on neutrality.

In Berlin,

Goebbels gloated that, while the United States had hoped
that Eire would join the Allied side as soon as troops
landed In Northern Ireland, it had obviously over
estimated thé situation»

"De Valera," Goebbels stated,

"isn't thinking of yielding to such a psychological
squeeze."^9

German-Irish relations, which had reached an apex
during the period from July, 1940 to June^ 1941, steadily
decreased in Importance in the latter stages of the war.
Three major reasons are responsible for the decline;
after June, 1941, with the initiation of Operation Barbarossa, the attention of Hitler was turned irrevocably
upon the east; by the end of 1941 any hope of invading

38 F.E.U.S., 1942, I, 759.
59 Goebbels, March 6, 1942, 114,
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Britain had slipped beyond the pale of reality; and
finally, the Battle of the Atlantic was, by 1943, con
sidered lost by the German naval command.As a result,
Ireland became of nuisance value only to the crumbling
Third Reich in the final years of the warà
While Ireland was no longer of direct import to
Germany, it nonetheless did Indirectly aid Berlin by
hampering Allied diplomatic maneuvers and causing embar
rassment in London and Washington on several occasions»
One such incident occurred in February, 1944, when
Roosevelt and Hull, fearing that their European invasion
plans would be divulged through Dublin» demanded that
Eire expel all Axis diplomats.

Britain, perhaps because

it was more familiar with Irish reactions to such affairs,
was less enthusiastic in its acceptance of the plan but
nevertheless followed the United States lead in the de
mands.
The American note, received in Dublin on February 21,
complained that Irish neutrality had "operated and in
fact continues to operate in favor of the Axis powers
and against the United States.The presence of the
German legation and Japanese consulate, the American
note continued, provided excellent subterfuge for Axis

60 See Chapter II, 61-62.
61 F.E.U.8.. 1944, III, 217.
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agents who could use the missions as a means of for
warding Important information to their respective
governments.

After requesting, the recall of the Axis

diplomats, the American note quite openly confessed
that "we would be lacking in candor if we did not state
our hope that this action will take the form of sever
ance of all diplomatic relations between Ireland and
those two countries,
On the following day the British note was sent to
Dublin.

The United Kingdom representative in Dublin, George

Maffey,^^ presented the note which concurred with the
American message and added that L-the British government
"warmly welcomed" the American initiative in the matter.
De Valera reacted with understandable swiftness.
On the same day the American note was received in Dublin,
the United States Minister in Eire, David G r a y , w a s
infoirmed that it would be impossible to comply with any
of the filled demands.

In reaction to what was considered in

Dublin to be a serious threat, Eire's tiny army was placed on

62 F.R.U.8.. 1944, III, 218.
^3 Diplomatic relations did not exist between Eire and
Britain, and as a result, Maffey was appointed at the
beginning of the war to the rather vague position of Britain's
"representative" in Eire, the only link between London and
Dublin.
David Gray, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Pleni
potentiary, February, 19^0 to April, 1947,
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the alert, leaves were cancelled, bridges mined and all
strategically important positions guarded,^-5
Eire's formal, and lengthy, denial of the United
States request was received in Washington on March 10.
After reaffirming his previous refusal, de Valera re
minded the American president of the long history of IrishAmerican relations.

Eire throughout the war, de Valera

stated, had scrupulously abided by its neutral-position,
aad had Instituted rigid security and censorship measures
which guaranteed that no vital information would pass
out of the country.

Finally, the Irish Prime Minister,

in speaking of the British note, reminded Roosevelt that
opinion in Eire toward Great Britain had greatly improved
because that country had not violated Ireland?s neutrality.
The Irish government finally consented to strengthen
its security measures, and on May 1? Roosevelt agreed to
let the matter rest.

The Axis representatives nonetheless

remained in Dublin.
The occasion of Eire's next snub to the Allied powers
arose on October 9, 19^4 when the United States requested
that Eire refuse asylum to Ails war criminals.

Once again,

de Valera upheld Eire's right to remain as indiscriminately
neutral as it wished.

The Irish government, de Valera

65 Survey, VII, 248-252.
66 F.E.U.8., 1944, III, 233.
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stated, could give no assurance which would hamper its
right to grant asylum, "should justice, charity or the
honor or interest of the nation so require.The
Prime Minister also pointed out, rather soundly, that
there was no precedent in international law to cover
the American request.

Furthermore, Eire had, since the

beginning of the war, denied entrance to any alien who
might prove at variance with national interests, and it
would continue to do so.^^

As in the previous case, this

issue was also allowed to rest without the Allies gaining
Irish compliance to their demands.
The policy of neutrality, which had become something
of an obsession in Eire, was carried out to the final
moments of the war.

De Valera, upon hearing of Hitler's

death at the beginning of May, 19^5, personally called
the German legation, presenting to t!^ German representatlves the official condolences of his government»
While de Valera might simply have been carrying out his
diplomatic duties, the event was viewed by most people,
including the Irish, as an Insult directed at the Allied
69
governments. ^

U.S. Department of State, Bulletin, XI, November
19, 1944, 591.
^8 Ibid.
69 Survey. VII, 252.
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Eduard Hempel and his assistants were still at their
posts in Dublin when World War II ended.

The mere fact of

their presence was a signal victory for German diplomacy,
for it served as anlindication of Eire's indiscriminate
neutrality until the very end of the war., While German
diplomacy had sought throughout the war to maintain that
neutrality, the Mllhelmstrasse was not the agency which
gained the most benefit from Eire's neutral position.

The

German military establishment, rather than the diplomatic
corps, made the most use of the various opportunities which
became available.as a result of Irish neutrality.

The most

important opportunity which the Nazi military seized was the
neutrality of the Irish sea ports and bases.

CHAPTER II
THE GERMAN SUBMARINE CAMPAIGN, THE IRISH SEA PORTS,
AND THE BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC
The Irish bases first came to the attention of the major
powers during World War I.

At the beginning of the war the

British, while unquestionably the masters of the sea, were
ill-prepared for the newest and most successful weapon in
the German naval arsenal, the submarine.

During the first

months of the war, German submarines made several attacks
upon the poorly organized defenses of the fleet headquarters
at Scapa Flow, causing the ships in port to put to sea hur^
riedljo

The raids upon the naval base prompted Admiral Vis-

oount Jellicoe,1 commander of the Atlantic fleet, to seek a
more secure headquarters.
Admiral Jellicoe, after an intensive study, decided upon
the use of Lough Swllly, on the northwestern coast of Ireland, as the main base for the fleet.

The Lough proved to be

an easily defended port, in that its narrow entrance could
be readily obstructed.

In addition, the water In the Lough

^ Admiral Viscount Jellicoe, John Rushworth, l859^i935o
In 1910 Jellicoe was appointed Vice-Admiral in command of the
Atlantic fleet, and in March, 1915 he became commander of the
Grand Fleet. In I9I6, because of his performance at the
Battle of Jutland, he was created First Sea Lord.
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was quite shallow, thus making it extremely difficult
for German submarines to slip through while submerged»

p

Accordingly, on October 23, 1914, the first contingents
of the British fleet, the 1st and 4th Battle Squadrons,
arrived at Lough Swilly. During the next months, until
Scapa Flow was once again ready for use, the Lough re
mained the main base for the British Atlantic fleet.

Admiral

Jellicoe later stated that, as a result of the transfer of
the fleet to Lough Swilly, "for the first time since the
declaration of war the Fleet occupied a secure base. „ „ „
The relief to those responsible for the safety of the Fleet
was immense."^
As the war progressed, the submarine continued its
role as the primary weapon in the strategy of the German
naval high command.

Newer, better armed submarines, capable

of staying at sea for longer periods of time, began to make
an appearance in the well-traveled waters off the southern
coast of Ireland.^

For a number of years the German U-boats

were allowed to operate with comparative unrestricted ease

2 Admiral Viscount Jellicoe, The Grand Fleet, 1914-1916,
(New York, 1919), 143.
3 Ibid. 146.
4 For a complete description of the convoy routes
around Ireland, see Archibald Spicer Hurd, The Merchant Navy,
(London, 1921).
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in the area, due largely to the inadequate number of British
anti-submarine forces.

It was not, in fact, until the

United States entered the war that the vital area around
Ireland was properly defended.
The first American military aid received by the Entente
powers was directed toward reinforcing the anti-submarine
campaign.

The United States and Great Britain had pre

viously reached an agreement by which the American navy
would be allowed to stations ships at Queenstown and Berehaven in southern Ireland.

On May 5» 1917, the first con

tingent of American naval forces, six destroyers, arrived
at Queenstown, and two months later a total of 34 destroyers
were based at the I±lsh port.^
The Queenstown area comprised 25,000 square miles of
water south and west of Ireland, and "up to this time had
been badly protected.

In the zone, which was so vital a

focus of trans-Atlantic shipping, the United States Navy
thus at once began and continued to render, a most needed
service against the U-boats in British waters."^
The naval base at Berehaven, while it played a more
minor role in the anti-submarine campaign, nonetheless
became increasingly important during the later stages of the

5 Thomas G. Frothingham, The Naval History of the
World War, (Cambridge, 1927), 36-37.
~~
6 Ibid, 82.
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war.

In 1918, as the result of an Allied fear of the re

appearance of the German High Seas Fleet, three of America's
largest capital ships, the battleships Utah, Nevada and
Oklahoma, were sent to Berehaven.

When it became apparent

that the High Seas Fleet was no longer a threat, the battle
ships were employed on convoy duty, guarding American troop
ships against attack as they approached the British Isles.^
By the end of World War I, the ships based at Queenstown and Berehaven comprised fully one-fifth of the total
American fo^^es in European waters, and Queenstown had
developed into the second largest United States naval base
O
in Europe, exceeded only by Brest, France.
Following World War I, the Irish ports were returned
to the complete control of Great Britain.

For the next

twenty years they were a point of contention between the
representatives of Britain and the newly arising Republic
of Ireland,

After five years of conflict (referred to in Ireland
as the Anglo-Irish war, and in England in somewhat less
imposing terms), an accord was reached between England and
its rather quarrelsome neighbor to the west.

By the terms

7 Frothingham, 24^.
® For details of the number of American ships stationed
at Irish ports, see Appendix.
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of the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty, Ireland was granted, for
the first time in nearly 700 years, a measure of independ
ence from Britain.
However, the independence gained by Ireland in 1921
was not complete.

Three Important restrictions were placed

upon the new Irish Free State:

the British retained their

right to control Irish policy In external affairs; the
northern six counties (known collectively as Ulster) were
allowed to remain "outside the Free State in a close union
with Great Britain, and finally, for purposes of defense,
the British retained the right to maintain and garrison
the three Irish ports at Queenstown, Berehaven and Lough
Swilly.^
In the seventeen years following the Anglo-Irish
Treaty the questions of partition and Ireland's external
association with Great Britain remained in the forefront
of Irish demands upon the British government.

The issue

of the Irish ports, and the British personnel stationed at
those ports, slipped into the background of Anglo-Irish
affairs.
In 1938 the growing tension on the European continent
moved, for reasons of security, the Conservative government

^ Dorothy MacArdle, The Irish Republic„ (New York.,
1965)® 592. Hereafter cited as MacArdle.
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of Neville Chamberlain to seek closer relations with the
Irish Free State.

As a result, talks were begun in Lon

don by Chamberlain and the Irish Prime Minister, Eamon
de Valera.
Chamberlain, no doubt remembering previous diffi
culties with Ireland during wartime, came to the conclu
sion that the possibility of having a friendly Ireland
at England's back would be improved if he acceded to some
Irish demands.

For his part, de Valera arrived in London

with one thought uppermost in his mind—to seek an end
to partition.

The question of the Irish ports was still

of only secondary importance at the beginning of the dis
cussions.
The discussions became immediately deadlocked over the
question of partition.

Chamberlain had no desire to coerce

the staunchly pro-British Northern Ireland into effecting a
11

union with the South,

De Valera was equally adamant In

his demand that the northern six counties be included in
the Republic of Ireland.

As the talks reached an Impasse*

Bromage, 263.
Survey. VII, 233. In a genral election held on
February 10, 1938, during which time partition was a main
issue, Northern Ireland had reaffirmed its determination
to stand by Great Britain rather than effecting a union
with Southern Ireland.
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the two prime ministers, in an effort to salvage something
of the meeting, agreed to drop the partition issue and
turn instead to the question of the Irish ports then held
by the British.
The two powers, after some months of debate, reached
an accord in April, 1938,

By the terms of the new treaty

Great Britain agreed to transfer to the government of Eire,
as Southern Ireland was then called, all Admiralty and
property rights at Lough Swllly, Berehaven and Cobh (the
name Queenstown had been replaced by the Gaelic Cobh).

In

return, de Valera promised that Eire would deny the use of
the ports to any foreign power in the event of war.

12

Chamberlain*s willingness to abandon the naval bases
met with the approval of most members of the British govern
ment.

The Secretary of State for foreign Affairs, Lord

Halifax,declared that the safety of the British people
was "not diminished, but immeasurably Increased, by a free
and friendly Ireland."

The Chiefs of Staff also concurred

Bromage, 263.
1st Earl of Halifax, Edward Frederick Llndley Wood,
1881-1959. From 1925 to 1931. Halifax served as the Viceroy
of India, and from 1935 to 1937 as Lord of the Privy Seal.
In February, 1938 he became Foreign Secretary and remained
In thàt position until December, 19^0 when he became Ambass
ador to the United States.
Round Table, No. 116, "Disunited Ireland," September,
1939, 79F:
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with the decision, noting that If Britain were In wartime
to secure the ^prts for naval use, a division of troops
might be needed at each base to guard against a possiblyhostile populaèèçn The Royal Navy was of the opinion that,
with France as an âlly, adequate protection could be given
Britain's shipping routes without the use of the Irish
ports.
Amid the general acclamation of the treaty, one voice
was raised in protest.

In the House 6f Commons, Winston

Chruchlll, then not a member of the government, vehemently
protested thé signing of the treaty.

Churchill pointed out

that if in the event of war de Valera decided to remain
neutral, England's vital supply lines would be gravely
threatened through the loss of the ports.

The British

government was "casting away real and important means of
security and survival for vain shadows and for ease^"^^
The coming months were to prove Chruchlll's opinion
to be the most accurate.

In Germany, Britain's loss of the ports went unnoticed
by those members of the Third Reich who were to command the
German Submarine offensive.

In January, 1939, Admiral Karl

Doenltz, then in command of Germany's submarine forces,

Survey, VII, 234.
Ibid.
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complained of the problems which the German navy would
have to face in the coming war.^?

Due to the Increased

efficiency of the enemy air arm, he stated, German naval
forces could no longer reach the Atlantic supply routes
unnoticed.

In addition, even If the German forces could

reach the British shipping lanes, they would be faced with
further difficulties:
whereas the enemy had at his disposal ports and
dockyards on the west coasts of the British Isles
[including Ireland], that is, on the Atlantic
itself, where any damage and loss of fighting
power sustained in action could be made good, any
crippled ship of our own would be compelled to
undertake the long and hazardous journey back
through the North Sea . . . before It could
„
reach the comparative safety of German waters»
Doenitz failed to realize, at that time, that Britain would
be denied the use of the Irish bases on the Atlantic, or
that Germany would itself acquire Atlantic ports after the
fall of France.
When the European struggle began on September 1, 1939,
Prime Minister de Valera reiterated his long-standing

^ Karl Doenitz, born September, 1892. After serving
in the submarine service during World War I, Doenitz played
a major role in the formation and training of the submarine
command to be used by Germany in World War II. In 1942, he
was promoted to admiral, and the following year he became
Grand Admiral and given supreme command of the German navy
following Admiral Erich Eaeder's resignation. From May 1-23,
19^5s after Hitler's death, Doenitz served as head of state
and commander in chief of the German armed forces. He was
imprisoned by the Allies from 1946-1956 in Spandau prison.
18 Admiral Karl Doentlz, Memoirs ; Ten Years and Twenty
Days, (London, 1959)» 39. Hereafter cited as Doenitz.
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intention to maintain Eire's unequivocal neutrality
toward all powers.

Combined with the declaration of neu

trality was the automatic denial of the use of the Irish
ports to all belligerents.

To allow any of the opposing

powers to use the pôrts would have meant an Instant abandon
ment of neutrality and a threat to Eire's security.
In Britain, the lack of foresight exhibited by the
Admiralty in 1938 was still in evidence at the beginning
of hostilities,

Britain's loss of the Irish ports in war

time had not been forseen, with the result that convoys
were still routed around the southern coast of Ireland, an
area where anti-submarine forces were woefully Inadequate.
It was not until September 5 that Churchill, then First
Lord of the Admiralty, issued his first directive concern
ing the matter.

The directive instructed the First Sea

Lord, in rather caustic terms, to study the problem and
submit a report on the questions arising from thè ^socalled neutrality of the so-called Eire."

Churchill took

note of two possible problems arising from Irish neutrality
and the loss of the ports; (1) that Irish malcontents, who
were at thàt time conducting a terrorist campaign in Britain,
might supply fuel and provisions to U-boats on the west
coast of Ireland, and (2). that the efficiency of the
British destroyers might be decreased due to the additional
radius of action brought about by the lack of bases closer
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to the shipping lanes.
The value of the Irish ports became apparent in
the early stages of the war when, immediately after the
beginning of hostilities, the German Naval High Command,
Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine (OEM), began operations
against British shipping.

Admiral Doenitz, a firm advo

cate of submarine wolf pack tactics, had been forced by
inadequate numbers to send single U-boats into the Atlantic
shipping

lanes.20

Accordingly, his first order called for

the assignment of individual areas of operation off Ireland's
western coast.

After the first month of the war, German

successes led the submarine command to issue orders for
the intensification of submarine activities In the oper
ational areas south and west of Ireland which, in Doenitz's
words, had "so far shown itself to be our most profitable
area."^1
To insure thàt the Irish ports would remain free of
British anti-submarine forces, the German foreign office,
during the period of the "phony war'," sought to reassure

Winston 8. Churchill, The Second World War, I,
"The Gathering Storm," (Boston! 1949), 428-429. Hereafter
cited as Churchill, I.
Doenitz had earlier stated that Germany, if it was to
win the-Battle of the Atlantic, needed at least 300 U-boats.
However, at the beginning of the war he had only 57 In his
command, of which only 20 were operational at one time.
Doenitz, 109, passim.

47
Dublin that the Reich government would religiously re
spect Irish neutrality—provided that Eire returned in
kind.

In November, 1939 the German Minister in Eire «

Eduard Hempel, informed Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop
that German policy had succeeded to the point that Great
Britain, and not Germany, was thought to be the main threat
to Irish security.

To further strengthen the Irish In

their determination to remain indiscriminately neutral,
Hempel suggested that German naval forces around Ireland
refrain from attacking ships of Irish registry, or neutral
ships bound for Ireland,

22

Following the minister's

suggestion, German U-boats, while taking advantage of the
lack of anti-submarine forces, nonetheless avoided attack
ing Irish ships.

Vessels bound for Ireland were stopped,

and, once their identity was proven, were allowed to con
tinue on to their destination unscathed
During the time that Germany was thus carrying on a
successful campaign against British shipping around Ire
land, negotiations were begun between London, Belfast and
Dublin in an effort to find a solution to what was rapidly

22 D.G.F.P.. VIII, Doc. No. 401, 466.
23 Bound Table, No. 117, "Neutral Ireland," December,
1939, 147.
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becoming a serious threat to British security.

In all the

negotiations the Irish government remained adamant? de
Valera would not consider a change in the status of the
Irish ports until the partition question was finally seta '24
tied.

To compensate for the loss of the ports in Eire, new
bases were established at Belfast and Londonderry in
Northern Ireland.

The German submarine campaign, while

it was somewhat hampered by the new bases, was not seriously
restricted.

Both basçs were found to be too far from the

waters where the escorts were moèt needed.

In addition,

neither site had previously served as a naval base, and
thus required a period of transition before they were
ready for use.

The British Admiralty soon found that

even with the acquisition of the new bases in Northern
Ireland, outgoing and incoming convoys could only be
escorted to a point 200 miles west of Ireland.German
submarines could therefore operate in comparative safety
in all the convoy routes except those immediately adjacent
to Britain.
As the period of the "phony war" drew to a close,

Edgar Hclnnls, The War; the First Year, (London,
1945), 240-241.
Captain 8.W. Eosklll (B.N,), White Ensign; the
British Navy at War, 1939-1945, (Arinapolis, I960), 42.
Hereafter cited as White Ensign.
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some British authorities were inclined to look back upon the
1938 Anglo-Irish Agreement as a "disinterested but short
sighted act."^^

General Sir Edmund

Ironside^?

summed up the

attitude of the British military when he complained in March,
1940, "here we are fighting for our lives and, although Ire
land is presumably in the Empire, we cannot use her western
harbours for our destroyers.
each war.

They would save us 200 miles

Is there any other nation that would tolerate in a
OQ

life-struggle being denied something vital."

The German direction of World Mar II, and particularly
the Battle of the Atlantic, reached its apex during the
period from July, 19^0 to June, 1941.

It was during that

period that Prance fell before the German Blitzkrieg » thus
giving Germany much needed bases on the Atlantic and allow
ing Hitler to issue the orders for Operation Sea Lion, the
invasion of Britain.

Doenitz's submarine command, with

its main base located at Brest, was also able to greatly
intensify the attack upon convoys destined for Britain.

White Ensign, 42,
General Sir Edmund Ironside, 1880-1959. Serving as a
brigadier, in 1918, Ironside was on the General Staff to the
Allied expedition in Archangel, and in 1920 he led the British
military expedition to Hungary. Between September, 1939 and
May, 1940 he was Chief of the Imperial General Staff. He
retired in July, 1940 after serving two months as Commander
in Chief, Home Forces.
28 General Sir Edmund Ironside, The Ironside Diaries,
1937-1940. (London, 1962), 23.
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In July, 1940, as a result of the German possession
of bases in the Bay of Biscay, use of the convoy approaches
around the southern coast of Ireland was discontinued.
From that time until the final months of the war, convoys
used what became known as the northwest approach.

Ships

leaving North America" rendezvoused at Greenland and pro
ceeded to Britain on a northerly route, entering British
waters around Northern Ireland.

Those convoys which came

from South America, the Mediterranean, and around the Cape
of Good Hope, followed the African coast and, upon entering
the North Atlantic, widely skirted western Ireland and used
the northwest approaches to reach their British ports.

With

the change in the convoy routes, Cobh, on the southwestern
coast of Ireland, lost its importance as a possible base.
However, Lough Swilly and Berehaven remained of interest
as possible bases of anti-submarine and escort

forces.

Doenitz had anticipated that with the change > in the
convoy routings ships destined for Britain would for de
fensive purposes become widely scattered.

The submarine

command was pleasantly surprised when, because of inade
quate escort forces, the convoys continued to stay within
the well-defined shipping lanes in the northwest approaches»
While the submarine command was thus aided by Britain's

^9',Roskill, The War at Sea, 1939-1945, I, "The Defense,"
(London, 195^), 2ÏÏ3T Hereafter cited as The War at Sea.
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adversity, Deonltz was nevertheless still hampered by
an old problem; the lack of sufficient air reconn
aissance.

The U-boats J which throughout the war gained

successes far out of proportion to their numbers, could
not fully accomplish their mission unless they could
first find the enemy.

In the years prior to the out

break of war, Grand Admiral Erich Raeder,^^ commander
in chief of the German navy, had attempted to promote an
independent naval air arm, but had met with the stubborn
resistance of Heichsmarschall Hermann Goerlng who, in
addition to his other positions, was also commander of
31
the Luftwaffe..
Goerlng, whom Doenitz described as taking
t h e attitude .that "everything t h a t flies belongs t o m e t "
refused to allow the creation of a rival air force, but did
consent to transfer a small number of air reconnaissance
craft to the navy.

The submarine command found these

Grand Admiral Erich Raeder, I876-I96O. Raeder entered
the German navy In 1894, and by 1922 was a Rear Admiral, In
1939 he was named Admiral of the Fleet, the first since Tirpitz. He resigned In 19^3 after several altercations with
Hitler, Raeder was Imprisoned from 1946 to I956 by the Allies.
Hermann"Goerlng, 1893-1946. When Hitler came to power
In 1933» he named Goerlng Reichamlnlster, commissioner for
air, Prussian Prime Minister and Minister of Interior, In
1935 he became RelchSùiiaister for Air and Commander in Chief
of the Luftwaffe, and the following year he was placed in
charge of the Four Year Plan. In 1939 he was name Hitler's
successor, and the next year received the exclusive title of
Re1chsmarschall. In 1945 he was expelled from all offices,
and the following year committed suicide while a prisoner of
the Allies.
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additional forces to be
meagre in the extreme. So acute was the lack
of air craft possessed of necessary range, that
it was only now and then that one solitary
machine was made available to fly one solitary
sortie—and then only over the areas southwest
of Ireland,32
The submarine command was thus unable to carry out
reconnaissance on the well traveled areas off northwestern Ireland.

However, scattered reports reaching

Brest from flights over southwestern Ireland did prove
to be of value.

During July, 1940, German U-boats sank

38 ships of 196,000 tons, including the troop transport
Mohammid All el Kabir which, because of the lack of
bases in Eire, was excorted by only one vessel at the
time when it sank off the Irish coast.
Although the submarine arm of the German navy was
still hampered by a lack of sufficient numbers,it
nonetheless operated with considerable success during
the summer of 1940.

In the period from May to Dotbber,

28? Allied and neutral ships were stink, of a total 1.5

32 Doenltz, 132-134.
The War at Sea. I, 349,
3^ In the year between September, 1939 and September,
1940, 28 new U-boats had been added to the original fleet
of 57 submarines. However, in thé same period 28 were also
lost, leaving Doentlz with a command as small as at the
beginning of hostilities. Doenltz, 109»
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million tons,^^

By far the most successful month in the

period was October, when the U-boats accounted for the
loss of 63 ships, including the Canadian Pacifie liner
Empress of Britain (42,348).

The Empress was torpedoed

and sunk by the U-32 on October 23 » two days after it
had been bombed and set afire while 70 miles west of
Donagal Bay, Ireland.

Captain 8.W. Roskil (E.N.) attrib

utes the death of the ship, the only one of the "giant
liners" to be sunk during the war, to the fact that once
again sufficient escorts could not be sent to the stricken
ship before i t w a s t o r p e d o e d , ,
During the same period relations between Berlin and
Dublin became somewhat strained following Luftwaffe attacks
upon a ship of Irish registry, the 8.8. Kerry Head.

The

German foreign office admitted the attacks on August 30,
and expressed regret over the incident.

Unfortunately,

Hermann Goering's Luftwaffe was, at times, prone to make
the same mistake twice.

On October 22 German planes once

again attacked the Kerry Head while it steamed off the coast
of Cork in southern Ireland.

The second attack was more

successful, resulting in the sinking of the ship and the
loss of all hands.

Doenitz, 108»
36 The War at Sea. 351-352.
37 Round Table, No. 121, "Ireland in the Vortex,"
December, 1940, 118=119.
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Relations between the two countries had, as a result
of the Kerry Head incident, reached a delicate stage by
the end of October,

However, at the beginning of Nov-

ember the situation was entirely reversed, when GermanIrish ties became firmer than at any other period during
the Second World War,
The stimulus for the improvement in relations came
not from Ireland or Germany, but from Great Britain.

On

November 5« Prime Minister Winston Churchill, speaking
before the House of Commona, denounoed de Valera for his
stand on the question of the ports, pointing out that,
"the fast that we cannot use the south and west approaches
of Ireland . . . and thus protect trade by which Ireland,
as well as Great Britain, lives, that fact Is a most gr^
"ewos burden and one which should Jnever have been placed
upon our shoulders, broad though they may be."

Churchill

also implied that German submarines were being supplied
with fuel and provisions in Irish ports,
De Valera viewed Churchill's comments as something
akin to a causas belli.

On November 7, speaking before

the Dall Elreann, the Prime Minister alerted his nation
to the threat posed by Churchill's speech:

38 Time. XXXVI, November 18, 1940, 26-2?.
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I want to say to our people, we may ie
facing a grave crisis, , , , There can be no
question of handing over these ports so long
as this country remains neutral. They are
ours and within our sovereignty » , , any
attempt by any of the belllgerents^-Great
Britain—would ionly lead to Bloodshed, So
long as this Government remains In office we
shall defend our rights In respect of these
ports or any part of our territory whosoever
may attack them.
De Valera concluded by stating that Eire hadbever harbored
or supplied German submarines.
In the three weeks following Churchill's November 5
speech, a number of notes were exchanged between the German
Minister Eduard Hempel and Ribbentrop, discussing the in
creasingly tense situation.
On November 29» following discussions with the Irish
Secretary General for Foreign Affairs, Joseph Walshe, Hempel advised his foreign office that there was fear in
certain circles of the Irish government that the British,
"reckoning on the Impending loss of their position in
Europe and the Mediterranean . , . would attach special
importance to having possession of Ireland when the new

The Times (London), November 8, 1940.
The only reason, during this period of the war,
that German submarines were known to have landed in Eire
was to debark survivors of torpedoed ships. Round Table,
December, 1939» 14?.
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order Is established."^^

The question of the ports might

be used as an excuse to accomplish this task,
Hempel further stated that the Irish had started pre=
parations for the possible defense of their country.

The

Irish army, consisting of 150,000 men including reserv
ists, was prepared to carry on the defense of Eire by
employing guerilla tactics or by launching an attack
upon Northern Ireland.

If German military aid was sought,

as Bëmpel assumed it would, that assistance would probably
come in the form of early effective action by the Luftwaffe,
However, military aid was not to be the only type of support
given Eire.

Keeping in mind the always delicate partition

question, Hempel suggested that,
of at least equal importance to the early
arrival of German B&llitary] aid in the event
of an English attack is in my opinion a 8lmul=
taneous German declaration . . . that we will
champion the complete independence of a united
Ireland from England at the peace negotiations
to come. The Irish determination to resist
would thus be greatly strengthened from the
outset by us too.^^
De Valera, while expressing appreciation for the
offer, declined to accept any such assistance until
Britain made an actual move to forcibly reolain the ports.

D.G.F.P.. XI, Doc. No. 419, 736.
Ibid.
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While the diplomatic maneuvers were being carried
out In the background, the German submarine command was
successfully conducting the blockade of Britain, which
had originally prompted Churchill to make his House of
Commons address.

In November, British food imports

dropped below one million tons for the first time since
the war began.This was again due to the serious lack
of protection for the convoys, resulting from the loss
of the Irish ports and the ever^deoreasing number of
destroyers available for escort duty.

The situation

grew worse as the threat of invasion by Germany contin
ued, causing the Admiralty to withdraw still more destroyers
from convoy and anti-submarine duty and place them in
defensive positions In the areas directly threatened by
invasion.
After Churchill's direct approach to de Valera had
failed, he turned to other, more Indirect, sources of
persuasion.

The United States, with its large population

of Irish-Americans, was in an excellent position to bring
pressure to bear upon Eire.

Churchill felt that President

Franklin D. Roosevelt could, while maintaining his country's
neutrality, contribute more toward the successful con
clusion of the Battle of the Atlantic.

In a telegram

Laurence Thompson, 1940, (New York, 1966), 229.
Hereafter cited as Thompson,
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iih
to Canadian Prime Minister Mackenzie King,
Churchill
had earlier complained that Roosevelt had not as yet
given any practical aid, such as destroyers, planes,
"or by a visit of a squadron of their Fleet to Southern
Irish ports.

After the fall of France the United States

had, indeed, given 50 destroyers to Britain, but In Deo=
ember, 1940, few of those ships were in seaworthy condi
tion,^^
Churchill wrote Roosevelt in December that, as a
result of the overextension of British flotillas, the
continued export to Eire of 400,000 tons of foodstuffs and
fertilizers would be halted,

"Perhaps," wrote Churchill,

this may loosen things up and make him [de Valera]
more ready tô consider common interests, , , . you
will realise also that our merchant seamen, as well
as public opinion generally, take It much amiss
that we should have to carry Irish supplies through
air and U-boat attacks and subsidize them handsomely when de Valera,is quite content to sit happy
and see us strangle.
Throughout the winter, the British Prime Minister con
tinued to seek additional American assistance for the pro
tection of the Atlantic convoys.

Such protection could,

Churchill theorized, be immensely more effective if the

William Lyon Mackenzie King, 1874=1950» King served
as Prime Minister of Canada from 1921-1926, 1926-1930 and
1935-1948, longer than any other holder of the office,
Thompson, 183.
Churchill, I, 6o6,
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United States could aoqulre bases in Eire for the dur
ation of the war.

If such a case was impossible, the

good offloes of the United States, as well as Its oonald=
erable Influence, might be used to exert pressure on Eire
to change its position.^?
The resultant pressure which was brought to bear 'iipon
Eire caused the Irish Minister to the United States, Robert
Brennan, to explain that Eire could not consider the cession
or lease of the ports to either side, since such a
would undoubtedly bring the war to Ireland:
The Irish dldn*t fight 700 years for their
survival as a nation In order now to embark
upon a policy which would Invite annihilation
. . . the map clearly showe that the ports
would be useful to Britain, Could It not also
be used to show they would be useful to Germany,
and will anyone contend that Germany would be
(equally) justified In demanding them on the
grounds of their usefulness.^"
Germany, however, had no Intention of forcibly
taking the Irish ports.

It had already been seen that the

ports. In the hands of an Indiscriminately neutral Eire,
were of Inestimable value to the operation of the sub
marine command In the Atlantic.

Therefore, Germany con=

tlnued 6n the whole to respect Irish neutrality and avoid
trouble with Dublin.

Churchill, I, 563*
Time, XXXVI, December 2, 1940, 6.
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The year 19^1 served as a turning point in the
operations of the German military, and subsequently.
In the relative Importance of Ireland and the Irish
ports.

The emphasis on the Battle of the Atlantis de=

creased with the beginning of the Russian campaign, the
entrance of the United States into the war, and the grow=
ing importance of the North African campaign.

However,

for the first six months of 1941 the area around Ireland
nonetheless remained a major focal point for the German
naval command,
Doenltz, early In 1941, had transferred a number of
his available U-boats from the North Atlantic to the
Freetown, Sierra Leone region.

When submarine activities

In that area met with considerable success, the British
reduced Freetown shipping to a bare mlnlmun, with the
result that Doenltz once again recalled the U-boats to
the North Atlantic.

Operating south and west of Ireland

with increased air reconnaissance, the German submarines
were able to exact a heavy toll on shipping en rotate to
Britain from the Mediterranean.^9
The lack of bases in Eire, while It still aided the
German submarine campaign,,in the waters south of Ireland,
was beginning to have less effect in the north.

German

submarine commanders operating in the northern approaches,

49 Doenltz, 177.
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where air reconnaissance was still not available, began
to encounter increased opposition by the Royal Air Force,
Submarine command discovered that the U-boats, if and when
they coùld find a convoy, where frequently driven off by
planes flying from bases in Northern Ireland,

By mid-19^1

the R.A.F, had established a "safe" area, extending from
the coast of Ireland westward for 400 miles, wherein the
convoys could traval with relative security.

In July and

August, 19^1» the effect of the increased air cover was
felt to the extent that submarine command reported the sink
ing of only ^5 ships.As the R.A,P. acquired newer air
craft of a longer range, the "safe" zone was extended to the
point that acquiring bases in Southern Ireland was not the
problem it had been during the first two years of the war.

The period between the autumn Of'19^1 and spring of
1924.3 was marked by the steady deterioration of the U-boat
phase of the Battle of the Atlantic.

The advanced efficiency

of the R.A.F, anti-submarine measures, the addition of a
great number of escort vessels due to the entrance of the
United States into the war, and the increased use of radar
and other technical advances prompted Doenitz, in May, 19^3»
to confess that Germany had lost the Battle of the Atlantic.

Doenitz, 273
51 Ibid.
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Although the Battle of the Atlantic was considered lost
in 19^3» U-boat" aetiirities did not cease.

Indeed, the pro

duction of newer» more deadly submarines enabled the German
U-boat command to harass the efforts of the Allied merchant
flèets until the last days of the war.^Z

As a result, Doe-

nitz continued to send individual submarines into the waters
surrounding Ireland—waters which could not be called com
pletely safe due to the denial of the Irish ports to the
Allies.
The United States, after its entry into ihë.war, had
taken the lead in attempting to coerce Eire into relinquish
ing its ports.

In 19^3» Roosevelt's secretary of state,

Gordell Hull,^^ once again raised the question of acquiring
the Irish bases.

Hull believed that "without question the

air and naval facilities in Ireland would be of considerable
usefulness to the United Nations' war effort," but hesitated
about the course to take to acquire the bases,-5^

The secret

ary of state, perhaps thinking of the reaction among IrishAmericans, believed that the matter should.be handled in a
52 In 1943 plans were begun for the construction of two
new U-boats, the Type XXI, with a submerged speed of 25 knots,
aM the $ype XXIII, a smaller craft with a submerged speed of
12 knots. Although a few were made ready before the end of
the war (see page 65)» they were not scheduled to become fully
operational until 1946. Doenitz, 35^-356.
53 Gordell Hull, 1871-1955. Hull served as senator from
Tennessee, 1931-1933, and Secretary of State, 1933-1944.
54 Gordell Hull, Memoirs of Gordell Hull, II, (New York,
1948), 1356-1357. Hereafter sited as Hull.
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quiet, diplomatic fashion.

To take strenuous action against

Eire might appear, in some circles, that the United States
was taking the side of Britain against the Irish and, hence,
that the United States was once again "pulling British chest
nuts out of the fire."^^
The matter was eventually turned over to the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, who were to conduct a study of the military
importance of the ports.

The Joint Chiefs came to the

conclusion that, while the value of the bases on the
United Nations overall war effort could not be exactly
foretold, their possession would prove a definite aid In
future strategic planning.

Consequently, Hull decided

that de Valera might be Induced to lease the bases to his
country's ancient friend and ally, the United States.
Before approaching the Irish Prime Minister, Hull first
sought out British opinion on the matter.

The British

Foreign Secretary, Sir Anthony Eden,^^ advised that de
Valera would never agree to leasing the bases, and that
stronger action "would likely give rise to acute diffi
culties,"57

Hull eventually concurred with Eden's opinion,

55 Hull, II, 1356-1357.
56 Anthony Eden, born 1897. In December, 1940 Eden was
named Foreign Secretary, From 1951-1955 he served as Deputy
Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, and became Prime Min
ister in 1955* serving until 1957.
57 Hull, II, 1357.
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and in December, 1943» the matter was dropped.

The question

of acquiring the Irish ports was not raised again for the
duration of the war.
Throughout 1944 the U-boat campaign was carried out
in much the same manner as in the previous years.

While

the measures taken against the submarines continued to
achieve success, the U-boats did score periodic victories
which proved costly to the Allies,

The situation became

Increasingly more difficult for the submarine command when,
after the Allied invasion of Europe and the subsequent lib
eration of France, the German navy was once again denied
direct access to the Atlantic.
After the German-occupied French ports had been re
claimed by United Nations' forces, the Allies concluded
that It was once again safe to resume the use of the south
ern approaches to Britain,

Ships en route from the Medit

erranean and Freetown could therefore use the shorter,
more direct route through the waters off Southern Ireland
to reach such British shipping centers as Portsmouth, Ply
mouth and Liverpool.
The German submarine command also realized that
traffic in the southern approaches would be resumed and
accordingly transferred a number of boats to the area
south of Ireland and in the Irish Sea. , The first months
of 1945 were, as a consequence, more successful than any
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in the previous year.
In the first days of January, U-boat command trans
ferred 20 submarines to the southern approaches.

By the

end of the month 39 were in the area. Including the first
of the Type XXIII boats (U-2324),

The Royal Navy, as a

result of the resumption of trade in the south, was forced
to withdraw some of Its forces from the north, with the
result that submarines were able to operate in the North
Foreland for the first time since the second year of the
war.59
During the final months of the war German efforts
were centered in the Irish Sea.

Despite heavy concen

trations of anti-submarine forces in the area, the U-boats
gained a volume of sinkings serious enough to cause concern
in the Admiralty,

Among the most successful of the sub

marines was the U-1055 which, between January 9-11, sank
three ships.

The U-1302 also âucceeded, on March 2, in

sinking two ships in a single convoy.

The European war ended with Lough Swilly, Berehaven
and Cobh still firmly in Irish hands. It is difficult to
estimate, in the strict limitations of weeks and months,

58 See Rosklll, III, 291^495.
59 Ibid. 291-292.
60 Ibid. 295.
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to what extent the Allied possession of the ports would
have shortened the war.

However, It is nonetheless safe

to assume that, had the Allies been able to station the
same number of anti-submarine forces in Ireland that they
possessed in the First World War, the efforts of the
German submarine command would have been greatly hampered,
and the Battle of the Atlantic would have been lost much
sooner.

CHAPTER III
TEE ABWEHR IN NEUTRAL EIRE
I
On the morning of May 23, 19^7, Major Hermann Goertz,
Germany's most successful agent provacateur In Ireland,
committed suicide while he awaited deportation to his native
Germany,

The death of Goertz marked the final entry in the

history of Nazi Germany's attempts to establish an Intelli
gence network in Eire and a liaison with the "dark forces,"
as Churchill called them, of Ireland's underground national
istic militia, the Irish Republican Army,

Although the

story thus ended in post-war Dublin, one must look much
farther back than the Second World War to find Its beginning.
Indeed, to discover the roots of the question. It Is nec
essary to study the era wherein Europe was dominated, not
by Hitler's Germany, but by the Germany of Kaiser Wllhelm II.
In 1914, military and foreign affairs officers In Ger
many, faced with a war they had not started and enemies on
both their eastern and western borders, sought ways in which
they might diminish the power or number of their adversaries,
Ireland presented such an opportunity,
Ireland in 1914 was a country on the brink of civil war.

6?
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The long-sought Home Rule Bill was about to become a reality,
but not without the stubborn resistance of many elements In
Ireland,

The Protestants of Ulster Province, who advocated

union with Britain, were prepared if necessary to offer armed
resistance to Inclusion with the rest of Catholic Ireland as a
autonomous state.

Republican factions in southern Ireland

were equally disenchanted with anything less than complete
independence and the formation of an Irish Republic.
As a result of the existing conditions In Ireland, many
circles In Berlin advocated giving active support to the
Irish.

The advocates of German-Irish cooperation falsely

speculated that Britain, faced as it was with rebellion in
Ulster and continued republican agitation throughout the
rest of Ireland, would be in no position to sustain a con
tinental war at the same time.^
During the period preceding the outbreak of war, Germany showed Itself to bê Indiscriminate in Its aid to the
Irish, supplying material to both royalist and republican
alike.

On April 24, 1914, German gun runners landed a

shipment of 3^,000 Mauser rifles for the Ulster loyalists
2
at Larne, County Antrim,
In June, Captain Earnon de Valera,

^ Edgar Holt, Protest in Arms ; the-Irish Troubles,
1916-1923, (New York, 1961), 60. Hereafter cited as Holt.

110.

^ Dorothy MacArdle, The Irish Republic» (New York, I965),
Hereafter cited as MacArdle.

69
in command of E Company, Dublin Brigade^ôf -the republican
Irish Volunteers, received orders to march his men north of
the city, where they were to receive a shipment of Mauser
rifles from Germany,

Similar cargoes were also landed south

of Dublin.3
Throughout the summer preparations for the forthcoming
hostilities continued among both factions in Ireland, and it
was not until September that the situation notioably changed.
On September 14 royal consent was at last given to the Home
Rule Bill.

Unfortunately, due to the European war which had

begun the previous month, enactment of the measure was tem^)porariTy postponed,

A year later the British government sush
pended the bill for the duration of the war.
The passage and subsequent postponement of the bill

created spontaneous reactions among the Irish,

Although

the postponement of the measure alleviated some fears of
the Ulster loyalists, they were nevertheless in no way
pleased that Home Rule had been placed in the statutes of
Great Britain.

Among the republicans, the bill as it

stdod represented little more than a mere "scrap of
paper."-5

Even before the passage of the measure, on

3

Mary C. Bromage, De Valera and the March of a Nation,
(New York, 1956), 36-37. Hereafter cited as Bromage.
^ MacArdle, 118 and 133.
5 Ibid, 118.
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September 5 during a meeting of the Supreme Counùll of the
Irish Republican Brotherhood,^ the decision had been reached
militarily to rise against British rule.

The postponement of

the Home Rule Bill therefore served only to Increase an
already inflamed situation.
The position of the republican military arm in any con
flict with Britain was, at the least, extremely tenuous„
therefore became Imperative to seek outside assistance.

It
Of

the various sources available, two were more important than
any others s

the Irish in the United States, who had organ

ized into various nationalistic organizations prepared to
render aid to their former homeland, and Imperial Germany,
whloh oould offer not only military assistance, but also
polltloal recognition and financial aid.
While a link was being formed between the I.R.B. in
Dublin, the Clan na Gael? in New York and the Imperial
government in Berlin, yet another factor was added to the
already confused situation.

In October, 1914, Sir Roger

Casement,® an Irish patriot knighted for his humanitarian

^ Irish Republican Brotherhood, (I.R.B.) the fore
runner of the Irish Republican Army,
7

Clan na Gael, the strongest of the nationalistic
Irish organizations in the United States.
® Sir Roger Casement, 1864-1916» Served as British
Consul in Portugese East Africa, Angola and the Congo Free
State. Arrested for anti-British activities April 24, 1916,
and hanged on August 3»
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service in Africa, sailed from New York for Geimany.
Casement's self-appointed mission consisted of the search
for a clear agreement with Germany in which the Imperial
government would supply material to the Irish in their
struggle with Great Britain.

Sir Roger, whose ideas were

shared by many in Irish republican circles, took the view
that:
Ireland has no quarrel with the German people
or just case of offense against them , . , there
is no gain, moral or material. Irishmen can
draw from assailing Germany, The destruction
of the German Navy or the sweeping of German
commerce from the seas will bring no profit
to a people whose own commerce was long since
swept from land and sea . , , no Irishman fit
to bear arms in the cause of his country's
freedom can join the allied millions now attack
ing Germany In a war that, at the best, concerns
Ireland not at all, and that can only add fresh
burdens and establish a new drain. In the inter
ests of a another community, upon a people that
has already been bled to the verge of death.9
Sir Roger sought specifically, during his seventeen
month mission to Germany, to gain an official German
statement of its support and friendship, raise a brigade
from among Irish prisoners of war, and secure military
assistance for the struggle against Britain.

His success

was limited to an official announcement by the German
government, in the November 20, 1914 issue of Norrdeusohe

9 Peter Singleton-Gates, The Black Diaries of Sir Roger
Casement, (New York, 1959)» 358. Hereafter cited as 8ingleton-Gates.
10 MaoArdle, 127-129.
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Allp;emelne Zeltung, that it held a friendly attitude toward
the Irish people and hoped for success in their struggle
for independence.
mission failed.

Beyond this statement, however* Casement's

The Irish p.o.w.*8 proved unwilling to

abandon their British and French comrades-in-arms, and as a
result; the Irish Brigade numbered only fifty-two men when
Casement left Germany, In addition, the Imperial government
proved hesitant to provide the 200,000 rifles, artillery
pieces and ammunition, together with German "advisors,"
that the Irish nationalist requested.

11

During the period that Sir Roger Casement was in
Germany, the Irish Republican Brotherhood had completed
plans for the rebellion against British authority to begin
on Easter Monday, 1916.

To help equip Its fozroes, the

I.R.B. requested, through its representatives in the Clan
na Gael, that Berlin send arms and ammunition to Ireland.
The German government consented, and on April 9 the
steamer And, disguised as Norwegian, left Luebeck with a
cargo of 20,000 rifles and ammunition.

The Aud, after

suooessfully avoiding British patrols, arrived at Its
destination in Tralee Bay In southwestern Ireland,

Unfor

tunately, the ship reached the bay two days before its

MacArdle, 127-129. Casement's proposal to form an
Irish Brigade was not particularly unique. Detachments of
Irish troops had previously taken part in most continental
wars, and as late as 1898 an Irish Brigade had been formed
to take part in the Boer War—on the side of the Boers,
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agreed arrival time.

While awaiting the arrival of Irish

crews to unload the weapons, it was discovered by elements
of the Royal Navy.

To keep the weapons from falling Into

British hands, the German crew scuttled the ship before
It could be searched at the Queenstown Naval Base.

As a

result, Irish revolutionaries, particularly in the area
outside Dublins were badly in need of arms and ammunition
1P
when the Easter Rising began.
The leaders of the Rising were well aware of their
unstable position and hence had little hope of an ultimate
military victory.

They did, however, hope to hold the

British off long enough to raise the patriotic ardor
of all of Ireland, proclaim the Republic, declare war on
Britain, and henoe be reoognlzed as a belligerent power
under International law (not that the British needed to be
reminded of Irish belligerency) and entitled to take part
In the peace conference to follow the European war.^^

In

their estimates of the military situation at least, the
Irish leaders were correct.

Six days after the trl-color

had been raised, the last Irish Insurgent surrendered to
the British.
The Rising, which had never taken hold outside the
city of Dublin, might well have gone down In history as

Holt, 118.
13 MaoArdle, I56-I57.
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yet another abortive Irish attempt at gaining IndepeMence had it not been for the violent British reprisals
i /i
Which followed. General Sir John Maxwell,
In command
of the British forces and soon to be known as "Bloody
Maxwell" by the Irish, dealt with dispatch in the matter
of the revolutionary officers who had surrendered.

After

a peremptory court martial, each was executed by a British
firing squad.
Chief among the charges brought against the leaders
of the Rising, including Casement (who had been captured
after his return to Ireland a few days prior to the rebel
lion) was their supposed connection with Germany,

In

Britain, as well as in certain circles in Ireland, it was
believed that Germany had played a major role In the up
rising,

Among the Irishmen condemning the Insurgents for

their association with Germany was John Redmondleader
of the Irish Parliamentary Party.

Redmond, in describing

the Rising, stated that "Germany plotted it, Germany organ
ized it, Germany paid for It."^^

Although a gross over

estimate of the extent of German aid, Redmond's statement
Gen. Sir John Grenfell Maxwell, 1859-1929. Sir John
commanded British forces in India, 1914-1916, and was British
commander In chief of the forces In Ireland after the Rising,
15 MacArdle, 185»
John Redmond, I856-I9I8.
17 Holt, 118-119.

Leader of the I.P.P.
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nonetheless had a semblance of truth to it.

By the time

of the Easter Rising, everyone in Ireland had become
familiar with Casement's mission to Germany,

In addition,

the leaders of the rebellion had not been silent in their
appreciation of German aid.

In the proclamation which

established the provisional government of the Republics
issued on Easter Monday, they stated that the rebellion
had begun with the support of Ireland's "children in
America and by gallant allies in

"18

Europe.

The presid

ing officers at the British court martials and civil
trials which followed Easter week had little doubt to whom
the "allies in Europe" referred.
Maxwell's efforts to repress the Irish nationalists,
which at times took on an inquisition-like aura, caused
opinion in Ireland to become fused into one policy as it
had never before.

Public sentiment, which had been lacking

during the Rising, became inflamed to the point that a war
of rebellion erupted throughout Ireland,
Germany did not neglect to maintain ties with Ireland's
underground forces.

On several occasions, submarines were

reported to have landed on the Irish coast, and as late
as April, 1918, the British discovered German "plots" in
Ireland,

On that occasion, one Joseph Bowling, an ex-

18 "Proclamation of the Irish Republic" cited in
MacArdle, l68.
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corporal in the Connaright Rangers and a member of Casement's
Irish Brigade, had "been captured off the coast of County Clare.
It was shortly thereafter discovered that Dowllng had acted
under orders of the German General Staff, which wished to
find out the prospects for yet another uprising in Ireland„
Although the Irish republicans apparently knew nothing of
Bowling*s mission, the British used the occasion as a ready
excuse to re-arrest revolutionary military and political
leaders who had escaped death after the Easter Rising,
German-Irish underground relations continued during
the period following World War I,

In 1920, Robert Briscoe,

the representative of the Irish Republican Army^O in
Germany, succeeded in purchasing arms from non-official
sources»

Shipments of small consignments of arms ensued,

and as late as 1921 a ship of German registry, the Frieda,
was stopped by German authorities and, after being searched,
its cargo was found to be arms Intended for the I.R.A.^l
Although all German contacts with Irish underground
forces were seemingly broken after 1921, one event was yet
to occur in the pre-World War II period in which both would
participate.

The Spanish Civil War had in 1936 aroused

19 MaoArdle, 253-254.
20 By 1919, the Irish Republican Brotherhood had
assumed the name Irish Republican Army,
21 MacArdle, 400 and 539»
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the interest of all Europe, but particularly Germany and
Italy,

Germany, and in part Italy, was inclined to look

upon the struggle as a ready means of testing recently ae^.
quired military machines.

In Ireland, where sentiments are

always easily aroused, volunteers came forward for both
sides of the Spanish conflict.
One of the more noted of the Irish volunteers was
Frank Ryan.

Ryan was leader of the left-wing Congress

Party (which had previously broken from I.E.A. ranks) and
editor of the republican weekly newspaper. An Phoblaoht.
Shortly after the outbreak of the civil war, Ryan joined
the Lincoln-Washington Brigade, made up largely of IrishAmericans, and by 1938 had risen to the rank of Acting
Brigadier of the Brigade, In the summer of that year,
while taking part in action in the Ebro Valley* he was
wounded and taken prisoner by Franco's Italian allies.
Two years later, Ryan still languished in a Spanish jail
after all efforts to secure his release had failed,
Ryan was not, however, the only Irish politicalmilitary leader to take part in the Spanish Civil War.
General Eoin 0'Duffy, who like Ryan had at one time been
connected with the I.E.A., was a prominent member of the
Irish political scene.

After the 1921 Anglo-Irish Treaty,

Op

Enno Stephan, Spies in Ireland, (Harrisburg, P.A.,
1965)» 157. Hereafter cited as Stephan,
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0'Duffy had broken with the I.R.A, and had followed the
pro-treaty party of William Cosgrave.^^

In 1933» he was

placed in command of the National Guard, a fascist organ
ization also known as the Blue Shirts, which had been
formed to counter the power of the "red" Irish Republican
Army,

With the coming of the civil war in Spain, 0'Duffy

raised a 700 man force of Irish Volunteers which, under
the name of the 15th Bandera, became part of Franco's
forces on the Madrid front.

Following six months of fight

ing, O'Duffy's troops were recalled to Ireland after Eamon
de Valera, then Prime Minister and president of the League
of Nations, had proclaimed Ireland's non-interventionist
2Li
policy toward Spain.
During the subsequent war years, both Ryan and 0'Duffy
Were to play important roles in the efforts of the German
intelligence office to create an explonage system in Ireland.

By the beginning of 1939» the German Abwehr (intelli
gence service), under the direction of Admiral Wilhelm
25 had become an extensive organization emplpylng

Canaris,

23 William Cosgrave, born 1880. Head of state of the
provisional government, 1922-1932, opposition leader during
World War II.
Stephen, 28.
Adm. Wilhelm Canaris, head of the German Abwehr,
1934 until the time of his death in 1944.
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agents In most European countries.

However, due largely

to Hitler's belief that Britain might yet be convinced not
to oppose German moves, the Abwehr had not begun Operations
in Ireland,

The situation drastically changed when, in

January 1939» the Irish Republican Army issued a "declar
ation of war" against Great Britain.

The Irish ultimatum,

signed by Sean Russell,the I.R.A. Chief of Staff, warned
that unless all Crown agencies and forces were immediately
withdrawn from Northern Ireland, terrorist operations would
begin in Britain itself.

When the British government

made no move to comply with the I.R.A. demands, sporadic
bomb explosions were heard throughout England.
The Abwehr office was not slow to discern an advan

tageous situation.

Regardless of the foreign office ban
28
on all intelligence activities in Ireland, Abwehr II,

under the direction of Lt, Colonel Erwin Lahou8ln,29

Sean Russell, Director of Munitions, I.R.A., 19211922, pre-World War II Chief of Staff, and hence, the leading figure in the I.R.A, Died in 1940, while en route to
Ireland from Germany,

27 PoreiKn Polloy Reports. XXX, 1939, 279-280.
pQ

Abwehr II was primarily concerned with espionage
activities and the maintenance of contacts with discontented
minority elements in other countries, Stephan, 26.

29 General Erwin Lahousen, chief of Abwehr II, 19391943, Appeared as a prominent prosecution witness at the
Nuremberg trials following World War II« Died in 1955°
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prepared to dispatch its first agent to Ireland,

The

German agent, Oscar C. Pfaus, was to proceed to Ireland
via the normal transportation routes and establish con=
tacts with the I.E.A.

If the I.E.A. proved agreeable,

an Irish agent was to be sent to Berlin to begin formal
discussions concerning possible German aid to the under
ground army.30
Pfaus arrived in Dublin on February 3, and immed
iately sought out the only person in Ireland known to
the Abwehr, General Eoin 0'Duffy of the Irish fascist
Blue Shijyts.

Although OfDuffy most certainly was not

pleased with the prospect of aiding Pfaus .to establish
contacts with the I.E.A., a group which he considered
closely tied to the Bolsheviks, contacts were nonetbe™
less made.

A short time after his arrival, Pfaus met

with a number of the I.E.A.'s leading members, including
the chief of staff, Sean Eussell.

After he had received

Eussell's willing agreement to send a representative to
Berlin, Pfaus returned to Germany.

He was destined to

be the only Nazi agent sent to Ireland that succeeded in
eluding capture by the Irish authorities.

30
^ Stephan, 27-31.
31
^

Ibid, 31.
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Later In the monthr'the I.R.A. representative, James
0'Donovan, arrived in Hamburg and sought out Pfiaus, who
in turn sent him on to Captain Friedrich C. Marwede, the
Director of Office I West In Abwehr II <,

Lengthy discuss-

Ions between Marwede and 0"Donovan followed»

During the

talks the two men analyzed the I.R.A.'s role In the future
conflict and the formation of links between the agents of
the Abwehr and the I.R.A.

Following the meeting, 0'Dono

van returned to Ireland to place the German proposals
before the I.R.A.'s military oounsel.^^
While oommunloatlons were thus being formed between
Berlin and the underground army In Eire, the I.R.A.®s
terrorist campaign In Britain oontlnued.

At the begin

ning of Maroh, elements of the I.R.A. planted bombs on
aqueducts in the Grand Union Canal near London and the
Birmingham Navigation Caiial near Straffordshlre.^^

Al«

though neither attack suooeeded in destroying the agueduots, the threat of severe flooding no doubt raised the
ire of many an Englishman,
Although the I.R.A.'s terrorist aotlvities thus far
had been oonflned to Great Britain, de Valera nonetheless
moved to restrict the power of the republican army in

Stephan, 38.
33 Ibid.
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Ireland,

On Maroh 7, the Dall Elreann passed an Offenses

Against the State Bill by a 78-12 margin and Introduced„
from the committee stage, the Treason Bill which called
3li
for the death penalty in cases of treason,^
Shortly after the legal restrictions against the
I.E.A. were passed in Ireland, a second and much more
threatening measure was taken in Britain.

In the last

week of April the Roman Catholic hierarchy of England
and Wales officially threatened excommunication to any of
its church members taking part in the terrorist campaign.
The ohuroh hierarchy In Eire, however, refused to be drawn
into the matter.

Although the Irish church officials

deplored the I.B.A.'s tactics, they nonetheless publicly
approved of its Ideals.
On April 26, James 0*Donovan made his second brief
journey to Germany.

Once again he and. the Abwehr officials

discussed the possibility of forming more solid ties betweenthe two, of sending German weapons to Elte and of
furnishing the I.E.A. with a wireless set with which it
oould remain in closer contact with Berlin.

Although

0"Donovan left without receiving definite assurances of
German aid, he did reach an agreement by which a courier

The Times (London), Maroh 8, 1939o
35 Time, XXX, May 1, 1939, 55.
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oommunioations system would be established with Berlin.
In the meantime» the I.E.A, campaign continued.

On

May 30 the I.E.A. staged a massive demonstration in Bel
fast against the British presence in Northern Ireland.
The Belfast police department « as a result, was forced to
call out all of its reserves and use armored cars to
disperse the demonstrators»

Less than two weeks later,

on June 11, the Voelkisher Beobachter reported that "the
most extensive to date of the Irish attaoks on English
soil" had ooourred the previous night.

Thirty bomb ez=

plosions hal taken plaoe In post offices throughout
England, seventeen of whioh occurred during a single two
hour period In London, Birmingham aM Manchester.
The Increased ferocity of the campaign caused both
London and Dublin to take additional measures against the
I.E.A.

On June 23, the government of Eire declared that

the Irish Eepubllcan Army,iunder the Offenses Against the
State Bills was an unlawful organization and "one which
ought In the public Interest to be suppressed.
The most stringent measures against the I.E.A. were
taken In the British House of Commons where, on July 24,

Stephan, 40.
^7 Ibid, 41.
The Times (London), June 24, 1939®
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Home Secretary Sir Samuel Hoare39 called for the passage
of extraordinary measures to halt the terrorist campaign»
In posing his case, Sir Samuel stated that 127 bomb ineldents had oeourred since the previous January, with over
fifty taking place in London alone. In addition, British

police had uncovered an loB.A. plot (muoh in the spirit of
Guy Pawkes) to blow up the houses of parliament*

The most

serious point, however, was that the campaign was "being

olosely watched and actively stimulated by foreign organ
There could be little doubt as to which

izations.

"foreign organizations" the Home Secretary referred.
The British populace had only to wait two days for
the I.E.A. rebuttal.

R&publican bomb warfare, which

had previously been conducted without the purposeful
taking of human lives (only one death had occurred as a
result of the previous 12? bomb incidents), now took a
drastic turn.

On July 26 the I.E.A. pertetrated two

bomb outrages, "the brutality of which aroused great
horror and did considerable damage to its reputation.
Both bombs were placed in suitcases and left in the bag
gage rooms of the King's Cross and Victoria stations.
The explosions resulted in the death of one man at King's

Sir Samuel Hoare, British wartime Home Secretary.
Great Britain, 5 Parliamentary Debates (Commons),
CCCL (1939), 1049.
Stephan, 43-45.

85
Cross, and in severe injuries to five others at the Victoria
station.

The following night the I.E.A. made three further

attacks in Liverpool, one of which caused the collapse of
a bridge and halted barge traffic until the wreckage could
42
be cleared.
The I.RoAi, terrorist "war" reached its zenith during the
last month of European peace.

On August 25« a time bomb,

hidden in the carrier basket of a bicycle, exploded in the
busy Broadgate market street of Coventry,

The explosion re

sulted in the death of five people and left fifty others
seriously wounded.

The British authorities, armed with the

Prevention of Violence Bill which had been passed as a resuit of Sir Samuel Hoare's speech, quickly arrested a number
of suspects, two of whom, Peter Barnes and James Richards,
were tried and convicted of murder.

They were later sen=

teneed to be hanged in February of the following year,^^
As the European war began, the I.E.A. continued its
campaign of terror and violence in Great Britain,

As a

result, the British military and police personnel who
stood guard at England's vital bridges, tunnels and communicationncenters, did so not to protect against German
attacks, but rather, against the attacks of Irish saboteurs,

stephan, 43-45.
Ibid. 63, and Time. XXXII, February 19, 1940, 26,
E, 8, Turner, The Phony War, (New York, I96I), 12.
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The British had good reason to fear the continued efforts
of Irish saboteurs.

Shortly after the beginning of the war.

Colonel Lahousen's Abwehr II office had formulated plans
calling for the use of both Irish and Welsh malcontents in
Britain.

The German plan, consisting of two general mea

sures, called for the shipment of explosives to Irish and
Welsh "sympathizers" in Britain, the purpose being to conduct
sabotage attacks against British aircraft and munitions
plants.

The second part of the plan forsaw the shipment

of explosive charges to neutral ports, such as Antwerp,
where Irish and Welsh dockers omlLi tlben hjUie ttwrn aboard
British and Commonwealth ships bound for Britain.

The

charges would then be set to explode while the ships were
at sea. ^
While Lahousen was thus attempting to forge a work
able espionage ring in Britain, the German foreign mlnistry, with its usual pessimism, was taking a dim view of
any and all efforts to take advantage of the Irish nation
alist movement.

In a message to the foreign office on

October 14, Minister Bduard Hempel urged restraint in
all dealings with the I.E.A. which, in his opinion, was
"hardly strong enough for action with promise of success
or Involving appreciable damage to England and is probably

Charles Weighton and Gunter Pels, Hitler's Spies and
Saboteurs„ (New York, 1958)» 209. Hereafter cited as Weighton
and Pels. The work Is based on the war diaries of Lahousen.
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also lacking In a leader of any stature.
The Abwehr II office was not Inclined to agree oom=
pletely with Hempel, although It too was growing rapidly
disenchanted with the I.R.A. activities.

By the winter

of 19390 the I.R.A. campaign had sunk to the level of use
less attacks upon "cinémas, telephone kiosks, letter
boxes, and markets."^7

The I.R.A. might nonetheless prove

to be a useful weapon in the German intelligence arsenal
if It were placed under proper direction.

As a result,

the Abwehr II war diary noted, on November 28, that dis
cussions had begun with the Naval Operations Division as
to the possibility of landing an agent in Ireland by
Ui-boat.

The purpose of suoh a maneuver was to contact

the I.R.A., with the idea of oonvlnclng it to follow more
closely German direction.^®
A month later the I.R.A. briefly awoke from its
lethargy to achieve Its most spectacular success of the
war, the "Christmas Raid" on the Irish Army's Phoenix Park
Magazine Port in Dublin.

The December 23 raid, which marked

the beginning of I.R.A. activities in Eire itself, was
46
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completely JDloodless In charaeter.

The I,R„A„ raiding

party, consisting of 150 men in thirteen lorries, succeeded
in easily overpowering the regular army guards at the fort,
and made off with no less than 1,080,000 rounds of ammun
ition and numerous weapons,The effects of the raid
were immediate, and were felt as far away as Berlin.
The I.a.A., which had in the interim finally obtained
a transmitter, immediately radioed the Abwehr office to
Inform it of their success.

Kurt Haller, a section leader

in Abwehr II. noted in the organizations's war diary that,
although the German intelligence service would, have pre
ferred that suoh efforts were directed against the British
rather than the Irish, "nevertheless, as a result of the
raid the opinion gained strength that despite its weakness the I.E.A. was an element to be taken seriously.^^
The German determination to send an Abwehr agent into
Eire was thus strengthened by the I.E.A. coup.

The need

to reestablish communications between the I.E.A. and Ber=
lln provided yet another incentive for the plan.

The I.E.A.

transmitter, which for a number of weeks had been sending
largely irrevelant reports to Berlin, was seized by the
Irish police before the end Of the year.

The Abwehr

agent, Ernst Weber-Drohl, was therefore charged with the

Time, XXXV, January 15, 194-0, 27.
Stephan, 68.
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task of delivering another wireless transmitter to its
allies in Eire, In addition, the Abwehr instructed WeberDrohl to deliver $15,000 to help finance I.E.A. efforts,
to arrange for the sending of another I.R.A, representative
to Germany, and to attempt to convince the I.R.A. executive
counsel to "limit themselves to important objectives and
avoid wasted effort,
On January 28, 1940, the U~37 departed from Wilhelm8haven with Meber-Drohl and his equipment aboard.

Less

than three weeks later, on February 15» Abwehr II received
word that the agent had been safely landed in Ireland.
The valuable radio equipment was, however, lost when the
boat taking Weber-Drohl from the submarine to shore over
turned.

After landings, the agent immediately sought out

James 0'Donovan, who in turn placed him in contact with
the I.R.A. executive and provided a hideout for the vis
itor.

On March 27, the Abwehr II war diary noted that

messages from Hempel indicated that the agent had succeeded
in making contact with the I.R.A.^^
Unfortunately, the success of the German agent proved
to be short-lived.

A short time after he made contact

with the I.R.A., Irish secret police arrested Weber-Drohl.
the ensuing trial, which took place on April 24, proved to

51 stephaa, 75-76.
Ibid.
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be an excellent example of the laxness in the Irish jud
icial system during the early stages of the war.

Although

clearly a violator of the Aliens Act, Weber-Drohl received
only a £3 fine fdr his offense.

After being detained for

a short time by the secret police, the German agent gained
his freedom,53
In the Interim, the Irish government had moved to
curb the power of its own "fifth column," the I,R,A,

On

January 5» the Dail debated and passed the Emergency Powers
Bill.

The bill gave the government the extraordinary power

to intern without trial all citizens suspected of treason.
As a result, Irish jails quickly became filled with over
600 I.E.A. suspects.
Although the I.R.A, bomb campaign was severely re
stricted by increased security measures in both Great Britain
and Ireland, it nonetheless made one final effort on the
British mainland.

In mid-February, Peter Barnes and James

Richards, convicted of murder in connection with the
Coventry raid of the previous August, were hanged in Lon
don,

While the British populace viewed the pair as wanton

murderers, in Ireland they immediately became martyrs in

Stèphan, 82-85,
The Times (London), January 5» 19^0, and Bromage,
276.
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the cause of Irish freedom and unity.

As a conse

quence „ numerous I.E.A. bomb explosions occurred through
out Britain.

The most serious explosion was reported

in Liverpool, where the new Belfast steamer, the 8.5,
Munster, sank after a bomb exploded on board as it entered the harbor.
The February attacks proved to be the last success
ful efforts of the I.R.A, in Britain.

British wartime

security, plus the mass arrests and deportation of sus
pect Irishmen, quickly brought a halt to the terrorist
campaign.

The I.E.A. thereafter confined Itself to

operations In Northern and Southern Ireland. James
0^Donovan, who not only had served as the I.E.A. repre
sentative In Berlin, but also had trained youthful I.R.A.
bomb-throwers and drawn up the plans for the English OEua-palgn, was quite critical of the I.R.A. "war" In Great
Britain.

0^Donovan stated that because the I.E.A. had

not waited for substantial German aid or the occurrence
an event such as Dubklrk, the campaign had "brought nothing
but harm to Ireland and the I.R.A.
The I.E.A., nonetheless, continued Its efforts In
Ireland,

In February, elements of the I.E.A. attacked the

Time, XXXV, February 19» 19^0, 26-27, and Bromage,
275-276.
Stephan, 38,
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British military depot at Ballyklnlar in County Down,
Northern Ireland.

After overpowering the guards, the repub

licans raided the arsenal, and seized over 200 rifles and
assorted ammunition.

De Valera, who was himself an I.E.A,

veteran, angrily denounced the nationalist activities on
both-sides of the border,

"Instead of being patriots," he

stated, "they (are) behaving as nothing but

"57

traitors.

The end of the I.E.A. campaign In Britain concluded
the first phase In Germany's attempts, operating in con
junction with the I.E.A., to establish an intelligenceespionage network In Ireland,

The second phase, which

continued for approximately one year, until June, 1941,
was marked by the frenzied efforts of the German Abwehr
to bring some direction to the I.R.A.'s rather haphazard
activities in Ireland,

To accomplish this task, the

Abwehr employed a number of agents in Eire, the most
Important being the tragl-oomic figure of Captain Dr,
Hermann Goertz.

Captain Goertz, like most of his compatriots sent
Into Eire, had little or no knowledge of Ireland or Irish
affairs.

Indeed, his primary recommendation for the

Survey of International Affairs, 1939-1946, VII,
"The War and the Neutrals," (London, 1956),239-240. Here=
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mission seemed to lie in a previous arrest for spying in
Britain,

Nonetheless, in May 1940, Abwehr II found it

self in dire need of establishing a reliable agent In
Eire, and Goertz was chosen,

<8

Goertz, who received his orders directly from Admiral
Canaris, later explained to the Irish secret police that
he had had a threefold mission in Eire.

Goertz was to

support, whenever possible, those elements in Ireland
which sought the maintenance of Irish neutrality and
hence the denial of Irish harbors to the British,

Such

a situation was viewed by the German navy as "very sat
isfactory and „ <, , entirely in our interests that there
should be no change in this position."^9
Secondly, Abwehr II Instructed Goertz to exploit
and direct the efforts of the "national revolutionary
group" in its activities against the British enemy,

Flna

lly ,, as the Abwehr II agent stated, "I was to try to stir
up a partisan war in Ulster,"^®

Admiral Canaris forwarned

Goertz that, in fulfilling his mission, the agent could
utilize only the intelligence resources to be found in
Eire,

Believing the I.E.A. to be well armed after the

58 Stephan, BBff,
Ibia. 98-99,
Ibid,
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raid on Phoenix Park, Abwehr II informed Goertz that
German weapons and advisors would be forthcoming only
after a general revolutionary movement, directed against
the British in Northern Ireland, seemed eminent.
By the first week of May the German intelligence
department had come to the decision that Operation Malnan,
the code name of Goertz's mission, could begin.

Conse

quently, on May 7» the Abwehr agent parachuted into Eire.
After several days of hiking, during whlc time he had
neither food nor shelter, Goertz came to the first of his
prearranged contacts,

Goertz's contact, a Mrs. Stuart*

was the wife of an Irish author who at the time was serving
as an advisor on Irish affairs in Berlin.

After some time

Goertz met with James 0'Donovan, who took the German agent
to his own home in Shankill, a suberb of Dublin.

During

his three day stay at Shanklll, Goertz met several members
of the I.E.A. ezeoutlve oounoll, Inoludlng the new chief

of staff, Sephan Hayes.

Stephan, 98-99. The Abwehr office was apparently
not aware that three-fourths of the booty from the raid.,
or 800,000 rounds of ammunition, had been recovered by
the Irish police.
Francis Stuart, the husband of Goertz's contact,
was an Irish author of some note who, during World War II,
served as a lecturer on Irish literature at Berlin Univer
sity, an advisor on Irish affairs, and made several broad
casts to his countrymen from Germany.
^3 stephan, 99» Stephan Hayes became chief of staff
when Sean Russell made a prolonged visit to the U.S. in 1939»

95
Following his stay in Shankill, Goertz moved to
his permanent hideout in Eire, the home of Stephan
Carroll Held,

The Irishman was no stranger to either

Goertz or the Abwehr office.

During the previous month,

Held had visited Berlin as the representative of the
I.E.A.

In addition to the usual requests for weapons

and financial aid. Held had also brought with him Plan
Kathleen (known in Germany as the Artus Plan), the pro
posed invasion of Northern Ireland,

Unfortunately, the

I.R,A,-sponsored plan proved to be childishly unfeasable,
as a result, the General Staff immediately disavowed
any possibility that it might be carried out successfully.
During the two months that he stayed at the Held
residence, the Villa Eonstanz on Tèmpleogue Epad, Dublin,
Goertz conducted several meetings with Hayes and other
I.E.A. officers.

At each meeting the Abwehr agent attempt

ed to convince the I.E.A. to abandon its fratracidal war
against de Valera's government in Eire, and turn Instead
to the more Important task of expelling the British from
Ulster.

The I.E.A. leadership, however, proved unable to

control its own forces, and the useless, sporadic fighting
64
continued.

stephan, 107-108.
Ibid, 122ff.
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Striking without warning, on May 23» elements of the
Irish secret police converged, en masse, upon the Villa
Konstanz,

Captain Goertz, who had been warned by his host,

managed to escape, but Held and one other suspect were
taken into custody.

Among the tlems found by police at

the Villa, were an opened German parachute, a Luftwaffe
cap, German uniform Inslgnlas, German World War I decor
ations, a radio transmitter, detailed maps of Irish bridges,
harbors and airfields, a box containing $20,000 in U.S.
currency, and Plan Kathleen,The repercussions from the
raid, needless to say, were quick in coming.
Prime Minister de Valera, in a torrent of righteous
wrath reserved normally for the British, denounced both
Germany and the I.E.A. for their roles in the affairs
It took 600 years to get Britain out of this
country. We don't want them or any others to
oome in here again . , . Unfortunately there is
a small group that appears to be meditating treason. I tell them . . . that such a state of
affairs will not be tolerated."'
On May 24, Minister Hempel informed the foreign min
istry about the Villa Konstanz raid.

Hempel, who had no

knowledge that German agents were operating in Eire,
remained Incredulous that Brandy (the name given Goertz
by Held) was indeed an Abwehr agent.

Time. XXXV, June 3, 1940, 39.
6? Ibid.

In fact, Hempel
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believed the affair to be hothlrsg less than a British
plot.

The so-called Brandy was not a German agent,

stated Hempel, but was In fact a British agent.

Hempel

believed that Bi^a^d.y'had gained the confidence of the
unwary Held In an effort to embarass the German Legation
In Dublin "in order to destroy Irish neutrality,"

The

raid on the Villa was, in short, "an act of agression
. . . against me and Held.
While the foreign office busily sought to smooth
the ruffled feelings of the Irish Prime Minister,
Abwehr II resignedly discarded Operation Malnau as a
failure.

The Abwehr II war diary hoted that, although

Goertz had escaped capture, he could be of ho further
use.

"Even if he is not captured in the near future,"

the entry read, "his further activity is rendered im
possible in consequence I of > the( dtS0Ov®yy' of the trans
mitter and money."^9
On June 1, Hempel finally received notification
from the Director of the Political Department of the
Foreign Ministry, Ernst von Woermann, that Goertz (Brandy)
was Indeed a German agent.

Hempel was therefore con

fronted with the difficult task of trying to restore
de Valera's confidence, which, to quote the minister,

D.G.P.P. IX, Doo. No. 314, 431.
^9 Stephan, 129,
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"has been shattered" by the Held oase.?^

Six weeks

after the arrest of Held, the foreign office still had
made little progress in restoring friendly relations*
In desperationJ Ribbentrop rather falsely informed the
Irish government, on July 11, that it was "an utterly
unreasonable suspicion that we might have the Intention
to prepare to use Ireland as a military base against
England through a so-called 'fifth column', which besides
does not exist.
Shortly after the arrest of Held, the foreign office
requested that the Abwehr department momentarily cease
operations in Ireland.

However, Abwehr I ^.ehose to dis

regard the pleas of the Wilhelmstrasse, and continued in
its efforts to establish a network in Eire.
In June, Abwehr I » in charge of operational reconsent two more agents into Eire,

The two agents,

Walter Simon and Willy Preetz, were to land by submarine
at different times in Dingle Bay on the western coast of
Ireland.

Both agents received identical assignments.

They were to transmit the movements of British convoys
for use by Admiral Doenitz's submarine command, and were to
send urgently needed daily weather reports for use by the
Luftwaffe.

Abwehr I ordered that they avoid all contact

D.G.F.P.. X, Doc. No. 79, 89.

71 Ibid, Doc. 149, 184.
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with the I.R.A.72
Willy Preetz, whose passport bore the name Paddy Mitch
ell, landed at Dingle Bay In the beginning of June.
reaching Dublin,

After

Preetz established himself In a shop by the

harbor area and proceeded to send dally reports to Berlin,
For several weeks the agent operated with little diffienlty.
Eventually, however» his neighbors became suspicious,, and as a
consequence, Irish police promptly arrested the agent.
Walter Simon, whose cover name was Karl Anderson» had
even less fortune than Preetz,

Landing In Dingle Bay on the

night of June 12, he made his way to Tralee where he hoped
to board a train for Dublin.

Unfortunately, Irish deteô-

ttm^were also at the railway station, and on the morning
following his arrival In Ireland, Simon found himself In an

Irish jail,

A jury later found the German agent guilty of

Illegal entrance Into the country, and sentenced him to

three years' imprisonment.?^
In July, 1940,

Abwehr II transferred all espionage

activities from France to Britain.

In connection

with

the increased emphasis on Great Britain, Abwehr II sent
three more agents Into Ireland.

During

the first week

of July, three agents, Dieter Gaertner and Herbert Trlbuth
72 stephan, 138-139.
73 Ibid, 144.
74 Ibid. 142.
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of South Africa, and Henry Obed of India, arrived via
cutter in Baltimore Bay on the southern coast of Eire,,
The Abwehr office had instructed the three men to separate
upon landing and individually find tmansportat&on to Brit
ain, where they were to carry out espionage activities.
The two Germans and one very dark-skinned Indian
quickly aroused 8uspj.clazi among the local inhabitants.
As a result, Irish police immediately arrested the agents»
When

the police searched the three men they found eight In

cendiary bombs,

four tins of explosives and £850 In Bank of

England notes, all of which prompted the Special Criminal
Court, on August 17» to sentence the agents to seven years"
penal servitude.7^
Due to the Abwehr's disillusionment with he I.E.A.,
all agents sent to Ireland after the arrest of Held had
been Instructed to avoid contact with the underground army.
The I.a.A. nonetheless remained a force which, if brought
under effective control, could be of inestimable value In
the struggle against Britain.

As a result, Abwehr II made

one final effort to exploit the situation.
At the end of January, 1940, the German consul-general

at Genoa received word that Sean Russell, the I.R.A.'s exchief of staff, would shortly arrive from the United States.

75 stephan, 150.

75 Round Table, No. 121, "Ireland in the Vortex,"
December, 1940, 118.
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Bassell, through his envoy John McCarthy, made It known
that, if Germany were prepared to do so, he desired to
return to Ireland aboard a German submarine.^7

The Abwehr

proved more than willing to provide the necessary transportation.
An immense opportunity presented itself in such a
mission.

Although Russell, because of his absense the

previous year, had lost much of his former influence, he
nevertheless was one of the few men who could weld the I.E.A.
into an effective force.

Abwehr II therefore took an imm=

ediate interest in the Irishman.
The primary weakness of all bureaucratic systems,
duplication of purpose and procedure, became manifest
during the four month period of negotiations which followed.
It soon became evident that thé Abwehr was not the only
department interested in Sean Bussell.

The foreign min=

istry had also seen the importance of the I.E.A.'s ezchief of staff, and had agreed with the Abwehr"s esti
mation of Rusêll's value.

However, the always cautious

Wllhelmstrasse feared tlœ reaction from Dublin if Germany
landed Russell in neutral Eire.

Consequently, Rlbbentrop

demanded that his office be allowed to take a hand in the
matter, and that restraint be taken in all operations

D.G.F.P.. VIII, Doc. No. 562, 693.
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Involving the Irièh nationalist.?^

Whan Russel arrived in

Genoa he was therefore met by two representatives of Hitler's
German, Dr. Franz Promme of Abwehr II and Dr. Edmund Veesenmayer of the forelng office.
On July 13» a second event of good fortune occurred
for the Abwehr.

Admiral Canaris, through personal contacts

with the chief of the Spanish secret police, secured the
release of Prank Ryan who had spent the previous two years
in Spanish jails.^9
The acquisition of Ryan's release proved to be of
at least equal value to the plans involving Russell„

Due

to his role in the Spanish Civivl War, Ryan had gained
the sympathy arid respect of Irishmen from all walks of
life, including de Valera who had personally written Generàl Pranclsco Franco in an effort to secure a parden for
RO
the Irish patriot.
Germany could therefore obtain a
diplomatic,"as well as intelligence, coup by successfully
landing Russell and Ryan in Eire.
Operation Dove, the return of Russell land Ryan to
Ireland, began in earnest on August 8, 1940.

Russell,

the leader of the two-man team, had not been previously
given specific instructions as to his mission.
78 D.G.F.P.. VIII, Doo. No. 605, 760.
79 stephan, 157.
80 Ibid. I85ff.

The Abwehr
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and foreign office no doubt believed', that any move the
two men took In relation to the Irish nationalist move
ment would be of value to Germany.

The Abwehr simply

informed Russell that future Instructions would be passed
81
on to him by a prearranged signal.
However, General
Lahousen later contradicted the nonchalance of the Abwehr
planners.

In an Interview with newsmen following the war,

he stated that Abwehr II's plans for Russell actually
Included the organization of an uprising in Ireland timed
to coincide with Operation Sealion, and the establishment
Op

of a base of sabotage operations in that country.
Whatever

the instructions might have been, they were

to no avail, for neither man was destined to return to
Ireland,

On August 14 Sean Russell, who had suffered

from an unknown Illness slnoe the beginning of the voy
age, died from what was later surmised to be a burst
gastric ulser.
ensign

His body was wrapped in a German war

and burled at sea, 100 miles west of Galway, Ire-

land.83

Frank Ryan, who had no knowledge of any operational
instructions for the mission, returned to Germany,

Ryan

hoped that the German authorities would organize a second,
similar mission.

The foreign office and Abwehr were,

81 Stephan, iB^ff,
82 Survey, 243=24^,
83 Stephan, 164,
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however, faced with the task of finding an explanation
for Russell's rather mysterious death.

As a result,

OperàtÈon Dwe was not attempted again.

Ryan remained

In Germany, where he became an unofficial advisor on
Irish affairs.

On June 10, 1944, he died in Dresden

after a six month Illness.
The death of Russell, and the subsequent cancell
ation of Operation Dove, caused a lapse In the Abwehr"s
attempts to infiltrate agents into Eire.

It was not,

in fact, until the following year that another Abwehr
agent landed in Ireland.
On March 12, 1941, Gunther Schuetz parachuted over
what he though was Newbridge, a olty located fifteen
miles west of Dublin (due to pilot error he was actually
sixty miles from his intended landing place).

Schuetz

brought with him to Ireland a radio transmitter, on which
he intended to make dally reports to the Abwehr on weather
conditions, convoy movements, and economic production in
Northern Ireland.

However, Schuetz never had the oppor

tunity to use the transmitter.

Barely twelve hours after

hi8..landing, Irish police arrested the German agent.

Stephan, 28^.
Ibid. 208.
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The Ignoble failure of Sehuetz's mission proved to
be the final lesson needed to convince the Abwehr of the
futility of such operations». As a result, the intelligence
service refrained from sending German agents into Ireland
for the duration of the war.
The Schuetz mission ended the second phase in the oper
ations of the German intelligence In Ireland.

The third and

final phaset lasting from 1941 to 19^5» was marked by the
formation of Irish and German military units for use in Ire
land, and the continued efforts of Captain Goertz to bring
cohesion to the I.E.A. campaign.

Following his narrow escape from capture during the
raid on Held*8 Villa Eonstanz, Goertz resolved never again
to aooept I.a.A. "protection."

As a result, during the re-

mainder of the time he continued at liberty, Goertz created
his own system of hideouts.

From his various bases, the

agent could conduct his operations without fear of investi
gation by the Irish secret police which continued its raids
on known I.R.A. meeting places.
Primarily because the Irish authorities had discovered
his presence in Ireland, Goertz concluded that his original
assignment had changed.

He how was faced with two major

^^Stephan, 130. The following is taken from Goertz's
testimony to the Irish secret police and articles which he
wrote following the war, cited In Stephan's work.
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concerns, "to learn as much as possible about the true sit
uation in Ireland," and to forward that information to the
87
Abwehr in German.
The first of Goertz's self-assigned missions proved the
least difficult to accomplish.

Through his contacts with

the I.E.A, executive, as well as numerous friends in all
walks of life in Eire, the agent succeeded in remaining
abreast of all new developments in Ireland.

However, the

forwarding of this information to Germany proved to be a much
more difficult task.

Because his radio transmitter had been

confiscated during the raid on Held's villa, Goertz was
forced to relyiupon a number of communication methods.

At

various times the German agent attempted to smuggle messages
out of Ireland via neutral seamen, by Falangist couriers from
Spain, by sending a message over the German Legation wireless,
and, on several occasions when the information appeared to be
vital, Goertz attempted to deliver the message personally by
leaving Ireland in rnumerous and assorted types of craft.
None of the methods proved acceptableThey were either too
slow, extremely dangerous, untrustworthy, or failed completely.
The most obvious means of communications was via I.E.A.
transmitter, but Goertz found the idea to be even more un-

Stephan, 178=179.
pa
$'or Q, description of Goertz's attempts, see Stephan,
Chapter 14.
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acceptable than the others.

To use the I.E.A. facilities,

which were quite poor, would hâve required the subsequent
use of the I.E.A. intelligence system* which Goertz described
as being "as primitive as that of children playing cops and
robbers.
The I.E.A. nevertheless proved to be of value.

In

late springs shortly before Schuetz's abortive mission,
Goettz received a wireless set and an operator from the
underground army.

To Goertz, the receipt of the radio

and operator was "the only valuable help which I re
ceived from the I.E.A.The German could thus send
regular reports to his superiors in Berlin, In several
cases those reports were believed to have concerned mil
itary intelligence gathered by the I.E.A. in Northern
Ireland,
In addition to his other duties, Goertz also contin
ued in his thankless attempts to convince the I.E.A.
leadership that they were accomplishing nothing by their
useless campaigns.

On one occasion, when the chief of

staff, Stephan Hayes, boasted that 5,000 Irishmen were
active members of the I.E.A., Goertz lost what little
patience remained to him,

Stat&ng that with _$00 discip

lined troops he could successfully march on Belfast, he

Stephan, I96,
90 Ibid, 198,
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exclaimed that by such action "these relatively few men
would have done more for Ireland than five thousand
talkers who argued about the legality of the second and
third Dall."91
Goertz's spirit rose when, in November, 1941, an
incident occurred which could well have proven to be the
agent's most valuable contribution to the German war
effort.

During the first weeks of the month Goertz was

contacted by officers of the Regular Irish Army.

Follow-

Ing months of futile conversations with the loR.A., Goertz
found, much to his pleasure, that the officers completely
concurred with his estimation of the Irish situation.
Furthermore, the Irish army officers Informed the agent
that they were prepared to confront de Valera and his
government with definite proposals regarding the acceptance of German aid In alleviating the border problem.
The German agent, who had not been empowered to make
definite proposals or agreements of German aid, would in
the Interim contact his superiors to place before them
the Irish plans.

The two parties agreed that Goertz should

travel, via Irish army plane, to the German headquarters
in France and there seek aid for the project.

Stephan, 196.
92 Ibid, 227-229.
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Unknown to Goertz, other German representatives
in Eire had also been contacted by elements of the Irish
military.

The Counselor of the German Legation, Henning

Thornsen, had carried on several conversations with a
"well known Irish officer," who was prepared to declare
himself In favor of German-Irish military collaboration.

93

In addition. Minister Hempel had also reported earlier
in the year that he had had conversations with a high
ranking officer who, for security reasons, was referred
to as "L"o

As in the previous eases, the officer informed

Hempel of the attitudes and personalities then prevalent
in the military and government,On all three occasions,
the German representatives refused to divulge the identity
of the Irish pffleers.
However, the contacts with sympathizers in the Irish
military never became delveloped.

On November 23, elements

of the Irish secret police, while In the process of raiding
a suspected I„R,A„ meeting place Blackheath Park, Dublin,
paused to investigate an adjoining house.

Inside they

found, and arrested, Hermann Goertz,^^
Goertz had succeeded In remaining at liberty In Eire
for nineteen months, longer by far than any of his fellow
93 stephan, 231,
D.G.F.P.. XII, Doc. No. 79, 152.
Round Table, March, 1942, 26?, and Stephan, 229,
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agents.

There are three possible reasons for his

success.

The first, and most likely. Is that the Irish

secret police simply failed to find him.

Secondly> the

possibility exists that the secret police knew of his
whereabouts during the entire period, and allowed him
to remain free so that they could legally arrest all
I.R.Ao suspects that came in contact with him.

Finally,

the de Valera government may have allowed Goertz to
remain at liberty for use as a possible liaison in the
event that Germany appeared on the verge of winning the
war,In connection with the last two points, one may
also surmise that Goertz's freedom became too much of a
threat when he was contacted by elements of the Irish
army—elements that supposedly represented the govern
ment and its policies.

Whatever the reason, It Is an

undeniable fact that during the long period of his service,
Goertz provided the Abwehr with its only reliable source
of information In Ireland,

During the same period that Goertz operated In Eire,
Abwehr and foreign office officials continued to seek ways
in which the situation in Ireland could be used to advan
tage,

One such plan was Operation Osprey.

Stephen, 2^0,

Ill
Operation Osprey Involved the landing of a para
military force in Ireland,

Because the program remained

in various stages of preparation for a period of two
years, It quite frequently changed in character and
outlook.

As originally proposed, shortly after the fall

of Prance„ the operation called for the recruitment of
a brigade from among Irish prisoners of war.

The mission

of such a force involved sabotage operations in Britain
and Northern Ireland, or, in the event of an AngloAmerican invaison of Eire, the organization of guerilla
operations in Southern Ireland.
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In the spring "of 1941 a special camp for Irish
p.o.w.*8 was established at Frlesack, Germany.

Three

men, Helmut Clissman and Dr. Jupp Hoven of Abwehr II,
and Frank Byan, began the arduous assignment of selecting
volunteers.

However, they met with even less success

than their World War I predecessor. Sir Roger Casement.
By the following year the three men had selected a
"Brigade" of ten Irishmen,

The twenty-four months of

preparation for the mission came to nothing when, shortly
after the foroe began actual training, the foreign office
and Abwehr department decided to abandon the project.

The

maintenance of Eire's neutrality was found to be more im-

9? Stephan. 235=237.
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portant than: the landing of a small force of saboteurs,
which might in some way upset the Irish political equil
ibrium.
A second, and less extravagant, proposal for Operation
Dsprey was made in August, 1941, when It appeared that a
British attack on Eire might be eminent.

The second plan

called for the infiltration into Eire of a three-man mission„
made up of Ryan, Clissmann and Bruno Eleger, a radio operator.

The three men were to act as a military "listening

post," to gather and send back to Germany information on
British operations during the invasion.

When the British

attack failed to materialize, the Abwehr cancelled the
The most ambitious proposal for Operation Osprey
was made at the beginning of 1942.

Walter Schellenberg,

Director of Office VI of the Reich Security Headquarters,
pa^posed that in the event of an Anglo-American occupation
of Ireland, the Abwehr department be relieved of all but
technical responsibility for Osprey.

In its place, the

foreign office and 8.8. were to carry out all necessary
arrangements.The Schellenberg Plan, as this phase
of Operation Osprey became known, called for the form
ation of an independent force, the No. 1 8*8, Special
Service Troop.

The 8.8. force, armed with armor-piercing

99 Stephan, 221-223.
100 Ibid. 234-235.
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weapons, was to be divided Into small detachments and
sent into Eire to work among the I.E.A. and partisan
forces which chose to resist the occupation.

The

Special Service Troop, which eventually numbered 100
volunteers, received its training at the Totenkamph
(Death's Head) Barracks in Berlin,

Helmut Clissmann

once again became part of the operation, being placed
In charge of training the troop In the use of British
weapons and in sabotage operations.

Unfortunately,

the training provided by Clissmann was once again wasted.
When it became apparent that no Anglo-Amerloan foroe would
invade Eire, this, the final proposal for Operation Osprey,
was also discarded.
In the years of war remaining, only two intelligence
missions occurred which involved either Ireland or Irish
nationals.

In midsummer, 1942, General Lahousen approved

a plan by which an agent would be dropped by parachute
Into Great Britain.

The agent, an Irishman whose name

remains unknown, received intensive training in indus
trial sabotage at the Abwehr training center in Berlin.
His mission Involved the perpetration of sabotage attacks
upon British aircraft industries, aluminium works and
hydro-electric installations in the Glascow area.

Al

though he successfully parachuted over Scotland, it is

101 Stephan, 234-235.
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not known whether his mission met with success or failure.

The final attempt by the Abwehr to send men Into Eire
occurred In 1943,

In December of that year two Irishmen,

John Kenny and John O'Heilly, parachuted Into Ireland.

They

were to transmit Information back to Berlin concerning the
Anglo-American military bulld-up prior to the Normandy
Invasion,

As was the ease with their German predecessors,
1 0?

both men were immediately captured by the Irish police.

The eight German agents sent into Ireland after the
beginning of hostilities spent the remainder of World War
II in Athlone Prison Camp.

On September 10, 1946, they

were contacted by a member of the Irish Ministry of Justice
and given the choice of returning to Germany or receiving
asylum In Eire.

Seven of the eight agents chose to remain

In Ireland* only Walter Simon, alias Karl Anderson, re
turned to Germany.
During the following months the ex-agents succeeded
in establishing a degree of personal life and security
In Ireland,However, in April, 194?, the western

102 Welghton and Pèls, 279.
103 Stephan, 278-279.
Ibid, 290ff.
Ibid. Hermann Goertz, in February, 1947, became sec
retary of an Irish relief organization for German children,
and the remainder of the Germans either established them-
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allies demanded the return of the seven to Germany for
Interrogation purposes„

De Valera, who was at that time

attempting to reestablish the diplomatic life of Eire,
complied with the allied request.

All the agents, except

Goertz, consequently returned to Germany.

Goertz, for

reasons known only to himself, chose suicide Instead.

There Is an old Gaelic slogan and war cry which proclaims that "England's difficulty Is Ireland's opportunity!"
The German Abwehr and the Irish nationalists might well have
employed that slogan during World War II to gain their Indi
vidual objectives.

However, both failed to grasp the Initia

tive In what was an extremely advantageous clrcumstahoe.
The history of the German attempt to gain a footing
In Ireland Is marked by a singular lack of success.

Few,

If any, of the Abwehr agents sent to Ireland had any knowl
edge of the land or people.

Individually, the German

agents no doubt were Intelligent, competant men.

However,

even the most Intelligent man will fall when he Is faced
with a situation that is completely alien to him.

selves in business or found jobs. The most successful of
the group proved to be Gunther Schuetz who started an
extremely profitable business dealing, ironically, in surplus
British war materials.
Stephan, 290ff.
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The poor preparation of the Abwehr agents was not
the only cause for the mlsearriage of Germany's intelli
gence designs in Ireland.

There existed in the Third

Reieh a basic dichotomy of interest that served to sub
vert the best laid plans of Berlin,

The Abwehr viewed

Ireland and the I.E.A. as simply a medium through which
it could conduct intelligence, espionage and sabotage
missions against Britain.

However, the foreign office

regarded Ireland in an entrlely different light.

To

the Wllhelmstrasse, Irish neutrality was not only an
accepted fact. It was also highly desirable.

Therefore,

Rlbbentrop's foreign office cautioned restraint whenever
It was In a position to ezert Its Ihfluence.
If Germany somehow had managed to correct its own
Internal problems. Its efforts in Ireland would. In all
probability, still have failed.

To achieve success In

Ireland, the Abwehr needed the complete and active support
of the Irish Bepubllcan Army.

At no time during the war

did the Abwehr have that support.
By 1939 the I.E.A, had disintegrated Into a mere
shadow of the organization that had literally torn Ireland
from the grasp of Britain following World War I.

Disunited,

largely purposeless, and without proper leadership, the
I.E.A. cou^i do little to he^p Itself without the additional
burden of helping someone else.

Hermann Goertz best summer-
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Ized the utter frustration felt by all those Germans
who attempted to bring cohesion to the I.R.A. when, in
1941, he told. Stephan Hayes' alde-de-oamp:
You (the loRoA.) know how to die for Ireland,
but how to fight for It you have not the
slightest Ideat^O?

Stephan, I96,

CHAPTER IV
THE PROPOSED GERMAN INVASION OF EIRE
Throughout World War II, Nazi German chose to utilize
Eire In a rather oblique fashion.

The previous chapters have

dealt, with Germany's "indirect" use of Ireland through diplo
matic channels, with Doenltz's use of a neutral Ireland to
strike at Britain's convoy routes, and with the Abwehr°s use
of Eire to conduct operations against the British in Northern
Ireland and Britain.

However, there is yet one final direct,

or active, means by which Ireland entered into Nazi strategy
during the Second World War—the proposed German invasion of
Southern Ireland.
The concept of invading Ireland as a means of striking
at Britain did not originate in the mind of Hitler or his
strategists.

As In the previous cases of Berlin's relations

with Eire, Nazi Germany simply carried on, or borrowed from,
well established precedents.

Indeed, attempts by various

European powers to invade Ireland had periodically occurred
since the sixteenth century.
The first of the more prominent invasion attempts, dis
counting the largely Ineffective sojourns of the Vikings,
occurred in 158O by Phillip II of Spain.

Phillip estab

lished during his invasion, a number of precedents which

118

119
were to appear in all the succeeding attempts.

For one,

the invasion was timed to coincide with a rebellion of the
native Irish against their British overlords.

The various

invasion attempts which followed also took place at a time
when the Irish were actively rebelling, or when a signifi
cant portion was prepared to rebel.
Secondly, the Spanish commanders found, much to their
chagrin no doubt, that they could not rely upon the support
of the Irish rebels.

The independent Irishmen, were loath

to accept orders of their "liberators," be they Spanish,
French, German, or whoever.

Closely coordinated campaigns

were therefore out of the question.

In addition, once the

rebellion had begun and the European troops landed, the
Irish exhibited a ludicrous desire and capacity for fighting
amongst themselves rather than against their British enemy.
Every rebellion in Ireland, including the successful 1916=
1921 rebellion, ended in a struggle involving Irishmen
against Irishmen, rather than Irishmen against Englishemn.
Such a situation was hardly conducive to a workable co
hesion between the European powers and their Irish allies.^

^ During the period crowned by the efforts of Phillip II
and the Tudors, Irish internal strife normally involved
clan warfare, wherein one or moré,ôlan6,'8UGb as the O'Neill
or the O'Donnell clans, would attempt to gain hegemony over
all others. Since that time, such wars have taken on a
religious tendency. Catholic vs. Protestant.
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The most Important precedent set by Phillip II was
failure»

A short time after the Spanish landed in Ireland,

the British surrounded the invaders in an Irish castle.
The debacle whioh followed resulted in the death of seventy-five percent of the force and imprisonment for the
remainder.2 Although hardly a happy precedent, it was
nonetheless one which would be inflexibly followed by all
Phillip's followers.
The most energetio efforts made toward invading Ire
land took plaoe during the period of the French Eevo=,
lutlon and the Napoleonic Empire.

In April 1796, the

Directory proposed invading Ireland with a large-scale
force of 20,000 troops.

Unfortunately, the plan remained

In abeyance until. In 1798, rebellion erupted in Ireland.
The Directory immediately proposed that the original
invasion force be sent to support the rebels.
the mission met with difficulty.

Once again,

Napoleon's Egyptian

campaign at that time absorbed the Interest of the French
populace and the resources of the Ministère de Marine.
As a result, the Invasion force which sailed from Bochefort on August 6, 1798, comprised only 1,200 men.

As in

the previous càses, the French could not gain the support
of the Irish revolutionaries.

The force surrendered on

September 8, less than three weeks after it had landed in

2 Mary Hayden, A Short History of the Irish People,
(New York, 1923), 233;
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Ireland.3
Nor did Napoleon himself have better fortune In
Ireland.

In 1804, while the emperor kmslly devised

ways In which he might defeat his oountry's arch-enemy.
Great Britain, the proposal was once again raised to
Invade Ireland.

As the year progressed, the planned

Invasion "passed definitely from a demonstration to a
resolve."^

The expedition, comprised of 18,000 men,

met with little success.

Like Napoleon's plan to ln=

vade Britain, the Irish Invasion proposal came to naught
whan the British gained command of the seas at the battle
of Trafalger.
Hitler was therefore well aware, not only of the
obvious advantages to be gained by Invading Ireland, but
of the far more numerous disadvantages that had been
Illustrated by previous attempts.

The Fuehrer, driven

by desperation, chose to disregard those lessons ani as
a result, came dangerously near to beginning an operation
that could have only ended In abject failure.

During the first months of the war, few German mil
itary strategists gave thought to Ireland as a possible

^ Capt. Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea
Power upon the French Bevolutlon and Emplrel (Boston,
1895), I, 347 and 379.
4 Ibid. 11^ 124.
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Invasion site.

For the moment, France And Britain were

the sole objects of German attention, the European contin
ent and the Atlantic the only arenas of warfare.^
Much of the same attitude was taken in Eire itself
during the first year of war.

An invasion by Germany

seemed in many quarters to be a vague, far distant threat,
hidden, as it were, behind the Siegfried Line.

For the

moment, the main threat to Eire came from its ancient
enemy Britain and what few defensive measures that were
taken were aimed primarily at Britain.

On May 23, 1940,

Eduard Hempel wrote Eibbentrop that the Irish Army,
together with the "nationalist population," were pre=
pared to carry on "guerilla warfare against an English
attack."^

As an after thought, Hempel advised the foreign

minister that German intervention would most likely be
greeted in a similar manner.^
Germany*8 Blitzkrieg through the Low Countries and
France served to awaken the blissfully lethargic attitude
of Dublin.

Hempel reported on June 21, the day that France

surrendered, that in a previous discussion with de Valera,

^ Again, disregarding the significant part Ireland
played in the Battle of the Atlantic.
^ D.G.F.P.. IX, Doc. No. 310, 422.

^ Ibid.
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the Irish Prime Minister had oonfessed that "with Germany's
closer approach anziety had increased . . . oonoerning poss
ible German intervention to use Ireland as a bease for att=
acks on

England."8

^he rapid succession of German victories

during the first year of the war had convinced de Valera
that it was futile for a small nation to attempt to repel
the aggressive designs of a major power.

If Britain attempt-

ed militarily to secure its western flank by invading Eire,
the Prime Minister was convinced that Germany would send a
force to halt such, a plan.

Obversely, if Germany intended

to use Eire as a base for attack against Great Britain,
the British would most certainly move to obstruct such
designs.

In either case, Ireland would become a battle-

ground and join the long list of small states that had
fallen prey to the machinations of larger states.9
Throughout the summer of 19^0, the Irish government
continued preparations for the attack, by either bellig
erent, which had become increasingly Imminent.

Believing

that only internal strength could convince Eire's adversaries that invasion would prove too costly, de Valera
had previously approved a 55,500,000 budget for the pur
chase of capital equipment.

With the money, the govern-

^ D.G.F.P.. IX, Doc. No. 506, 637.
9 Ibid.
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ment built airfields and an ammunition factory and
created a small navy and air forceDe Valera's minister of defense, Frank Aiken, also began the task of
expanding the 37,000 man army (which included reservists).
In addition to the expansion of the country's military
potential, the various defense committees and agencies
of Eire also took down all road signs, manned coastal
defenses, maintained a strict surveillance of all German
diplomats, and the amazingly effective secret police
curtailed the efforts of German agents sent into Ire=
land„^^
The Irish were not alone in their fear of an invasion
of Eire.

In Britain, several supposedly Intelligent

people fell prey to rather hysterical reports regard^
ing German désigna upon Ireland.

One such report, investi-

gated by the Invasion Warning 8ub=Committee, stated that
"German soldiers in civilian clothes are embarking at
Naples for Spain, whence they will be sent from Cadiz for
an attack qn Ireland,

10 Time. XXXVI, June 10, 1940, 37-38. The Irish navy
comprised six torpedo boats purchased from Britain. There
are no statistics on the air forba*
See Chapter III.
12 ?eter Fleming, Operation Sea Lion, (New York, 1957),
171=172. Hereafter cited as Fleming.
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A far more realistic view was taken by General Sir
E&mund Ironside,

The former Chief of the Imperial General

Staff, in a report to the Chiefs of Staff on June 30, put
forth his views on Operation Sea Lion, the impending
German invasion of Britain,

Sir Edmund pointed out that

due to Britain's long coastline and Germany's possession
of ports in France, Norway and the Low Countries an ln=
vasion force could land at almost any point in Great
Britain.

"They may," stated Ironside, "even take Ireland

first and so extend the possibility of landing still
further west . .

In addition, the main landings

would be supported by parachute drops. Involving up to
20,000 men, "anywhere in the United Kingdom or Ireland,
Less than a week later, after Sir Edmund had further
studied the matter, he estimated that the major German
invasion forces would land at Kent and East Anglla,

All

other landings, Including In Ireland, would be diversion™
ary in nature, to force the British to divide their
defensive forces,
General Ironside's estimate of the situation proved
to be the most aoourate.

The military strategists in

Gen, Sir Edmund Ironside, Diaries^ (London, 1962),
June 30, 1940, 375»
Ibid,
Ibid. July 4, 1940, 380,
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Berlin had indeed given Ireland a secondary role in
their plans for Operation 8ea Lion,

After the Invasion

of Britain began, a small expedition of ships was to
depart from Brest for the Invasion and, hopefully, the
conquest of Ireland»

The main Wehrmacht Invasion force

would then be supported by *a large scale" parachute
drop, sent to demoralize the Irish In the rear»^^

In

consequence of the Invasion plans, a force of five or
slz divisions not Included In the regular Invasion
forces began amphibious training off the west coast of
France.17
In addition to the actual Invasion plans, Ireland
was also Included In the German occupation plans.

The

Military Economic Staff, Wehrmlrtschaftsstab England,
proposed that Great Britain be divided Into slz Military
Economic Commands, based at London, Birmingham, Newcastle,
18

Liverpool, Glascow and Dublin.

While Germany planned and Britain prepared, Eire
continued with Its own defensive measures, still not sure

William L. Shlrer, Berlin Diary,
(New York, 1941), 553
Vo
17 Fleming, 262. Although the author gives a
description of the training of the Invasion forces, he
nonetheless believes the Invasion of Ireland to be
merely a deception.
18 Ibid.
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where the Invasion would come from.

On July 9» Prime

Minister de Valera stated that if Eire were attacked,
it was prepared to resist—-no matter what nation chose
to Invade.

De Valera at the same time onoe more sought

to end partition and reclaim Eire's "Hibernia Irrendenta,"
Using the highly credible premise that Ireland could
better defend itself whole and undivided, the Prime
Minister Invited the north to join In defensive measures
with the south.

Unfortunately, he insisted that neutral

ity be used as the basis for unification, a proposition
the pro-British Protestants of Ulster could not allow.
Three days later, the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland,
Lord Cralgavon, definitely rejected de Valera's offer.
The question of a united defense against invasion was
20
thereafter closed.
Measures to Increase Eire's military potential also
increased as Invasion became more of a threat.

Frank

Aiken reported on July 15 that 120,000 men had volun
teered for the army during the preceding six weeks, with
25»000 joining in the previous week alone.By the

The Times (London), July 9, 1940.
on

Ibid. July 12, 1940.
Ibid, July 15, 1940.

128
autumn of 1940, the Irish army had expanded to well over
200,000 men.22

Insofar as modern military statistics are

oonoerned, these are not impressive figures, particularly
when compared with the millions of men that both Germany
and Britain commanded.

However, Eire had two distinct

advantages that the occupied minor states of Ebrope had
not possessed.

First, Ireland's geographical position

made invasion by any major power, particularly Germany,
an extremely questionable enterprise.

Germany would

find no mere borders or frontiers to cross in invading
Ireland. Instead, an invasion force would be confronted,
even with the acquisition of Atlantic ports, with a dan
gerous voyage before reaching its target.

Once there,

long communications and supply lines would have to be
established and maintained^—lines which would prove easy
targets for the Eoyal Navy.^^
The second advantage held by Eire concerned the
martial qulaities of the Irish themselves, which stepped
far beyond simple ëlan.

Ireland in 1940 was "presumably

still supreme mistress of the art of guerilla

warfare.

"^4

Bound Table„ No. 121, December, 1940, 120.
23 Clarence Brinton, The United States and Britain,
(Cambridge, 1945), 117. Hereafter cited as Brinton.
24 Ibid.
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Nurtured during seven oentnrles of guerilla fighting,
including the more recent "Anglo-Irish War" and the "Time
of Troubles" in the 1920*8, the Irish were by far the
most experienced guerilla fighters in Europe,

Ireland,

as a nation and as a people, had grown aoouatomed to
living in more-or-less constant warfare,

Germany would

therefore be faced not only with the hard-core military,
in the form of the Irish Army and the I.E.A. (estimated
at numbering between 5,000=7,500 actlvisits and 15,000
"fellow

travelers"),

but also with virtually an entire

nation that presumably was ready to resume its old life
under conditions of guerilla warfare.
As each day passed during the autumn of 1940, the
opportunity for a suooessful German invasion of Britain
became more remote.

The two key factors in such an

invasion, command of the air and of the seas, could not
be wrested from Britain.

The superiority of the British

Home Fleet had gained the melancholy recognition of the
German strategists, Including Hitler, at the beginning
of the war.

However, the invasion oould still have

become a reality of Hermann Gearing's Luftwaffe had
gained control of the skies over Britain.

By November,

the Battle of Britain had begun to turn in the favor of

Time, XXXVI, June 10, 1940.
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the hard-pressed R.A.F.

As a consequence, Operation

Sea Lion met with frequent postponement.
On November 14-, Hitler, who was less willing than many
of his commanders to abandon the operation, ordered that
Sea Lion be revived.

"Each branch of the Armed Forces,"

he stated, "is to exert itself strenuously to improve its
position."26

xn addition, the November 14 directive out

lined the need to find alternative invasion plans if Oper
ation Sea Lion should prove impracticable.
Hitler believed that Germany might gain political
or military advantages by invading Britain via the in
direct route through Southern Ireland, The Naval Staff
was therefore ordered to study the means by which such
an attack could take

^7

place.

Military authorities in Britain had also reoognized
the danger of an invasion through Ireland and had acted
aoGordingly.

The oommander In ohlef of the Home Fleet,

Admiral Charles M. Forbes, had earlier agreed to transfer
his main forces to a more advantageous position if a
German invasion fleet appeared prepared to cross the
North Sea.

The Admiralty followed with a suggestion

P.M. Hinsley, Hitler's Strategy, (Cambridge,
England, 1951), 110-111.
Ibid.
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that two battleships be based at Liverpool where they
could easily Intercept any invasion forces en route to
28
Eire,
In addition, a large British force
been
gathered in Northern Ireland, seemingly ready to cross
the border "after the first shot had been fired at a
German,
On December 3» three weeks after Hitler had Issued
his invasion directive. Admiral Erich Raeder presented
the findings of the Naval Staff,
was plainly pessimistio.

His report to Hitler

The Admiral noted that the

greatest danger to Britain lay not in invasion, but
rather in the destruction of its Industry and harbor
installations by the Luftwaffe and the disruption of
its overseas supply lines by Doenitz's submarine commando
Furthermore, Raeder warned that Germany could ill afford
the loss of prestige which would follow an unsuccessful
Invasion attempt.

Such an event "would tend to prolong

the war and would, above all, create a strong impression
in the

U.S.A.

"3^

Finally, Raeder once more put forth

what had become his favorite plan; Britain could be
weakened by striking, with Germany's Italian ally, in

29 Rosklll, I, 251.
29 Time. XXXVII, January 20, 1941.
30 UoSo Navy Department, Fuehrer Conference on
Matters Dealing with the German Navy, December 3, 1940.
Hereafter cited as F.C.G.N.
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the Mediterranean theater of operations„
To support his arguments, Raeder brought forth a
lengthy sutdy made by the Naval Staff,

The primary

necessity of any invasion of Ireland was naval suprem
acy.

This the German navy did not have, and it "could

never be attained" due to the strength of the British
Home FleetIn addition, the element of surprise„
which had been well employed in Nprway,,wis"aid bë missing
in any invasion of Eire,

Because of Ireland's proximity

to Britain, any invasion fleet sent by Germany would be
quickly discovered by British patrols.33
Ireland's geographical position would also compli
cate invasion plans by forcing Germany to create long
supply lines which would Instantly become easy prey for
Britain's vastly superior navy.

Raeder further stated

that even the weather would make invasion an impossibil
ity.

Mindful perhaps of the Duke of Wellington,3^ Raeder

pointed out that Ireland's prevalent weather conditions—"
heavy rainfall* low clouds, and generally "very frequent"
damp and foggy weather—made effective air operations an

31 P.C.G.N.. December 3. 1940.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
3^ The Duke of Wellington once described Belgium as a
"dreary, dismal place, somewhat like the better parts of
Ireland."
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Impossibility»

Luftwaffe operations would be further

restricted by the need of flying from bases In France
through an area strongly contested by the
Hitler had previously stated that "the occupation
of Ireland might lead to the end of the war»"3^

The

Fuehrer was therefore reluctant to abandon the Idea
of Invading Eire,

Agreeing that Invasion could not

occur under the present conditions, he nonetheless con
tinued to believe that success might be achieved if
de Valera could be persuaded to seek German aid»

As a

result, even after Directive 21 (the invasion of Eusla)
had been Issued on December 18,Hitler continued to
regard the Invasion of Eire as a possibility.
Throughout the first part of January,1941, the
German radio oontlnuoùÈ^y warned thet-Irlsh that "Britain
is to invade Eire through Ulster . . . in such a case,
Berlin Is determined to react in the same manner as In
the case of Norway and Belgium,"3^

The Irish government

no doubt feared the possibility of a British attack.
However, the prospect of being treated In the same manner

35 F.C.G.N.. December 3, 1940.
36 Ibid.
37 Alan Clark, Barbarossa, (New York, 1965), 25.
38 Time, January 29, 1941, 39.
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as Norway and Belgium doubtless was looked upon as being
hardly a desireable alternative.

Consequently5 de Valera

maintained Eire's neutral position, and no request for
aid was made to Germany.
Although preparations for Operation Barbarossa had
already begun. Hitler sitll toyed with the idea of invading
Ireland.

On January 23, during a meeting with German

air officials, Hitler brought forth the idea of invading
Ireland by air.

The German Fuehrer believed that by

holding Eire he could "qulokly strangle Britain by cutting
her Atlantic lifelines and destroying (its) terminal on
the west ooast."^^

in conjunction with Hitler's air

borne invasion plan, Hermann Goertz received several
Abwehr messages instructing him to "report immediately
about Irish defence forces.
orlty."^0

Order from the highest auth-

is not known whether or not Goertz carried

out his orders, for after the 1940-1941 winter the pro
posal to invade Eire was completely abandoned.
The opportunity for a German invasion of Eire was
lost after the start of the eastern campaign»

Although

the threat of a British attack remained, by 1942 most
Irishmen could rest assured that "so long as Hitler is

39 Fleming, 296-297.
40 Ibid. 181-183.
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preoccupied in Eastern Europe, this Island will remain
outside the war.

Hltler'8 original views toward Ireland, either as
a deception for Operation Sea Hon or the main focus
of an invasion, were basically sound.

The possession

of Ireland might well have altered the outcome of Sea
Lion, and hence the outcome of the war.

However, the tact-

ioal possibilities for a suooessful invasion were praotioally nil.
In frustration Hitler began, after the feasibility
of Operation 8ea Lion waned, to reaoh for the most improbable plans.

Ireland had become, as one author points

out, a part of the "complex Hitlerian extravaganza,
Had Hitler decided to carry out his various invasion

plans, he would have met with a fate similar to his
Spanish and French predecessors-^abject failure*

Round Table, No, 128, September, 1942, 496.
Walter Ansel, Hitler Confronts England, (Durham,
N.C., i960), 231=232.

CHAPTER V
IN RETROSEEGT
The wartime relations between two states, like all
other aspects of aiplomacy, are normally judged by two
well dèflned standards-^suooess or failure.

However, It

l8 a praotlaal Impossibility tb draw a oonoluslon as to
whether Nazi Germany definitely suooeeded or failed In
Its alms regarding Ireland.

Because Germany ended the

Seoond World War as the vanquished power, one can with
some validity surmise that the loss of the war signifies
a subsequent failure of policy.

While many of the Third

Belch's plans regarding Eire did Indeed fall, there was
also a measure of success which cannot be overlooked.
It therefore becomes the duty of the historian to balance
the degrees of failure or^success to determine the final
outcome of that policy.
German diplomacy failed to create, or expand, proGerman sympathies and support for the German war effort
In Eire.

The opportunities which existed In Ireland,

particularly the partition Issue andtMw natural antag=
onlsm toward Britain, were such that Irish support for
the German cause could well have become a reality.
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How^

ever, because of the effeat of outside influences; suoh
as the United States and the Vatican; as well as the sensi
bilities of the Irish themselves; the large majority of the
population In Eire remained morally In support of the
Allied oause throughout the war.
Due to Hitler's Inability to provide adequate resources, Admiral Doenltz's submarine command failed com
pletely to exploit the neutrality of the Irish ports and
their subsequent loss to the Allies,

Had Doenltz been

provided with the number of submarines he ocAslderAd.
neoessary, the Battle of the Atlantic

and henoec World

War II, might well have ended differently.
The efforts of the Abwehr must also be described as
failures.

With the possible ezoeptlon of Hermann Goert#,

no German agent ever achieved the success that Berlin
desired.

No espionage network was ever suoceasfully created

in Eire»

No German direction was ever brought to the Irish

Republican Army,

In short, the history of German lntelli=

gence In Eire is one marked chiefly ky f&llure and a remarkable Ineptness,
Finally, the proposed German invasion of Eire was
also a failure.

In addition to the obvious

that the

invasion never took place, one may also justifiably
surmise that had invasion actually occurred, it too would
have failed.

The Irish most certainly would have resisted
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a German invasion to the utmost of their ability and
strength.

The British would have blocked the occupation

of a country so close to their homeland.

The United

States J with its large minority of Irish-Americans,
might also have been moved to enter the fray much sooner
then it actually did.

Hitler's invasion of Ireland would

have proven to be a disaster equalled only by the invasion
of Russia.
Such were the failures of German policy toward, and
exploitation of, Eire.

There was, however, one success

which German policy achieved in Ireland—the maintenance
of .Irish neutrality.

Despite frequent crises „ German

diplomats succeeded, with the aid of ineptness in London
and Washington, in placating Dublin each time relations
became strained to the breaking point.
The benefits which Germany received from Eire's
neutrality have already been cited, but a word might
yet be said concerning the possible effects of active
Irish participation in the war.

Had Eire joined the

Allied side in the conflict, the Irish ports would have
been opened to the Allies and hence Germany's efforts
to halt I^^Ltlsh shipping would have been seriously hampered.

Eire could have furnished more than a quarter of

a million men to the Allied armies, and additional sites
for training and debarkation of Allied operations.

The
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United States would most certainly have sponsored the
creation of Irish war industries which would have helped
supply and equip Allied military forces.

Finally, Great

Britain would have been assured that no German invasion
would come from the west,
Nazi Germany would have received no such benefits
had Eire joined the Axis powers in the war.

Eire had no

natural resources which could be used by Germany in the
same manner that It used the resources of Bussia, the
Balkans, and Norway.

Irish manpower could not be safely

transported to the Continent through waters and air largely
controlled by Great Britain,

In addition, an Ireland

allied with the Third Belch would have become a prime
target for an Anglo-American invasion and would, therefore,
have required the protection of large German forces whloh
Berlin could hardly afford,
A neutral Eire was, therefore, of a far greater bene
fit to Germany than any active Irish participation would
have been,

Germany succeeded in maintaining and exploiting

that neutrality—a success that far outweighs its other
failures.

APPENDIX
American naval vessels actually present in European
waters at the cessation of hostilities in World War I »

Queenstown
59 ships
(2 tenders, 24 destroyers, 30 sub-chasers, 3 tugs)
Berehaven
13 ships
(3 battleships, 1 tender, 7 subs, 1 tug, 1 oiler)
Brest
85 ships
Cardiff
57 ships
Gibralter
5-5 ships
Genoa
2 ships
Azores
12 ships
Grand Fleet
5 ships
Murmansk
1 ship
Mine Force
13 ships
Southampton
4 ships
Plymouth
39 ships
Corfu
37 ships
Liverpool
1 ship
total - 373 ships
In addition to the naval forces stationed in Ireland,
the United States also began, in 1917, the use of air craft
In anti-submarine warfare.

By the time of the armistice

there were 26 naval air stations in Europe; l6 in France,
5 in Ireland, 3 in England and 2 in Italy.*

The preceding information was issued by the Office of
Naval Intelligence, cited in Frothingham, 261-262 and 285.
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present an interesting glimpse at the reasons for Eire's
wartime neutrality.

The Memoirs of Cordell Hull are quite

good for presenting highlights of American policy during
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Bewley (Ireland's pre-war minister in Berlin),

In study

ing naval matters, one cannot pass Hoskill's numerous
works which, although written from a British viewpoint,
present an excellent account of naval warfare between
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Also good., but not as rewarding for this

study, was Admiral Huge"s Per Zeefrleg.
The major source for studying the role of German
intelligence In Ireland is Enno Stephan's Spies in Ireland,
Stephan bases his work upon the unpublished Abwehr war
diary, personal interviews, and Hermann Goertz's testimony
to the Irish secret police—all of which are unavailable
in any other work.

Also important for this subject is

Welghton and Pels' Hltler*8 Spies and Saboteurs, which
although it does not concern Ireland directly, nonetheless
presents an interesting account of General Lahousen's views
toward Great Britain,
Of course, when studying World War II, Winston Chur
chill's The Second World War cannot be forgotten, Unfortun^
ately, after reading Churchill's six volumes, in which he
seldom refrains from making his opinion known, one begins
to feel that the Prime Minister dislike three individuals
more than any othersf Satan, Hitler and de Valera (not
necessarily in that order)„
Of the other materials used, the Round Table, the
magazine of the British Commonweath, is by far the best,
giving accounts and views not only of the European war,
but of all phases and areas concerned in World War II,
The London Times, while taking an imperialist viewpoint,
nonetheless proved to be of some value, as was the equally
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prejudiced Time magazine.
Paul Hogan'8 unpublished doctorate, "The Neutrality
of Ireland in World War II," was concerned primarily with
the internal affairs of Eire, and therefore lent little
to a study of its external affairs.
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